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


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
The ISOLATION of JAPAN

BY THE AUTHOR OF "THE PROBLEM OF JAPAN"

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
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THE ISOLATION OF JAPAN



THE ISOLATION OF JAPAN

AN EXPOSÉ OF JAPAN'S POLITICAL POSITION AFTER THE WAR

BY

THE AUTHOR
OF
THE PROBLEM OF JAPAN

IN ONE VOLUME



PUBLISHED BY C. L. VAN LANGENHUYSEN
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INTRODUCTION.

The author has been handed a number of able criticisms of his work, *The Problem of Japan*, written by the very competent critics on the staffs of leading Dutch journals, to wit:—the *Handelsblad*, the *Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant*, the *Nieuws van den Dag*, the *Maasbode*, the *Utrechtsche Dagblad*, the *Indische Gids*, and the *Nieuwe Financier en Kapitalist*, which take the author to task for what they assume to have been an ill-timed forecast of Germany's future attitude toward Japan and the problems of the Far East that are to emerge out of the recent world war. The work was completed and ready to come out of the hands of the printer on October 5, 1918, more than a month prior to the signing of the armistice between Germany and her enemies; and the aforesaid critics quote the following extract from the author's *Introduction* with the suggestion that the writer had evidently not foreseen the new situation that arose out of Germany's defeat in the war, and they intimate that the forecast would not have been made if the author had been able to foresee the swift march of events after October 5 which ended in the acceptance by Germany of the very severe terms of the armistice signed on November 11.

The extract in question reads as follows:—"As the reader will perceive, it is the writer's opinion that the problem of Japan will be solved in one of two ways—by a new combination composed of England, Germany and the United States, or by a new combination composed of Japan, Germany and

Russia. One of these two combinations must inevitably arise out of the present war."

The author hopes that he will not be accused of suffering from stupid pride of opinion if he asserts that notwithstanding all that has happened since he penned the lines just quoted, he remains of the same opinion still.

Our critics have overlooked the fact that the author predicted one of two possible combinations, of which the one was based on the assumption of German victory, the other upon the assumption of German defeat. In the one case, namely, in the event of victory, the German autocracy would have restored the Russian autocracy to power, and the three Emperors—the German Emperor, the Emperor of Russia, and the Emperor of Japan would have joined hands across the continents of Asia and Europe and would have dictated the destinies of the world. In the other case, in the event of defeat, the writer foresaw that Germany would become a Republic and that her future world role would thereafter be acted on an entirely different stage and in the company of quite new actors. What so natural as that a democratic Germany should ally herself with the great democracies of the West—England and America—and loyally support their policies?

And now, the question is going to be asked, how is an alliance between Germany, England and the United States going to subsist in the face of the new compact for a League of Nations which is to do away with all formal or secret alliances? Similarly the question might be asked as to how the United States was able to enter into a secret alliance with England and France in 1897 as detailed in *The Problem of Japan*, in the face of the fact that the Constitution of the United States provides that all treaties entered into by or on behalf of the United States must be ratified by the Senate, a provision that is intended to save the United States harmless

from entangling alliances. And the answer is that such an alliance, or its equivalent, call it amicable accord or community of interests if you please, is entered into by means of a so-called "gentleman's agreement." And such a "gentleman's agreement" will in due course of time mark the path of negotiations that will lead to a complete accord between Germany, England and the United States with respect to the problem of Japan and the coming events in the Far East. As will be pointed out in our introductory review or opening chapter of this volume and for reasons therein set forth, Russia will in all probability make common cause with England, America, and Germany, the three greatest democracies of the modern world and of the new era, to promote a uniform plan of operations in the Far East whose ultimate goal will involve nothing less than the emancipation and freedom of the Chinese people, and the establishing of that nation on a basis of perfect equality with the other nations of the world, untrammelled, and freed forever from any danger or threat of foreign interference.

THE HAGUE, March 15, 1919.

* NOTE:—The term "gentleman's agreement" as used by the author is intended to signify an understanding entered into by the parties concerned and adopted as a part of their future diplomatic policies without necessarily being reduced to documentary form requiring ratification by the parliaments of the respective parties. Such an understanding may be arrived at by an "exchange of conversations," conducted without publicity being given to the same.

INTRODUCTORY REVIEW.

The great war has not arrested the rapid march of events in the Far East, it merely closed one page of eventful history to open another destined to be a record of transition and development no less important than that which it succeeded.

To illustrate the truth of this statement it is enough to say that since the close of the war we have seen created a *Volkerenbond* or '*League of Nations* which marks the close of one epoch and the beginning of a new one in which treaties of alliances between nations and the principle of a balance of power have been done away with at one blow. Thus the treaty of alliance between Japan and England first created in 1902 and continuously subsisting ever since that date as the keystone of Japanese foreign policy has been relegated to the scrap heap and in its place Japan sees herself forced to take her seat at the council table of the nations shorn of her right arm of strength, her position endangered and even threatened from two sides—from out the sea, and from the continent, a position of unenviable isolation for the once proud humbler of Russia, for the nation that had arrogated to itself the right to the hegemony of the Yellow Race.

Another and even stronger blow to Japanese pretensions has been the successful intervention of America in the great war and the establishment of her position as a leader among the nations of the world, and the right of her President to assume the position in the settlement of the peace terms of an *arbiter mundi* whose slightest word is listened to by the

attentive peoples of the earth with such devotional eagerness as has never been accorded to any son of man since Moses descended from Mt. Sinai with the tablets containing the commandments of the Lord.

In approaching the new problems of the Far East, the reader should not lose sight of these highly significant circumstances. For the rest, it will be found that Russia will soon be on the road to recovery from the calamities of the war and will continue her steady advancement eastward into regions which graze and even overlap Japanese spheres of influence, and that Japan with a firm foothold on the mainland and a position of growing influence in China will let pass no opportunity for extending and strengthening her position of assumed paramountcy in the Far East.

Nor must it be imagined that, as in the past, the political situation is made up solely out of developments on the Asiatic continent. Japan's attainment to naval supremacy in the Pacific has been watched with deep anxiety not only by America but by Canada and Australasia. The aspirations of the Anglo-Saxon race in this region are opposed to the creation of a Japanese naval supremacy in the Pacific, and now that England has been relieved of the fear of German domination in Europe and she no longer needs to mobilize her fleet in North Sea waters, we may look for a resumption by the British fleet of her position as a naval factor in Far Eastern waters, and for Hong-Kong once more to be restored to its importance as the naval base of a powerful British Squadron as in the days (prior to 1898) when Germany's plans for naval power were still unhatched in the brain of Admiral Tirpitz.

But events of a stupendous nature are impending in the Far East, for there is China—the impenetrable, the irresistible, the all consuming, all devouring China, a nation whose territorial possessions are so vast, whose population is so immense

that it pricks all the powers of the imagination to conceive even remotely the extent of her greatness, or to guess at the powerful, if not preponderating influence, she is destined to have on the world's future. And this China, this colossus of the nations, Japan has had the audacity to treat as an inferior, an object for exploitation, and to imagine that she can roll it up like a piece of matting, tuck it under her arm and walk off with it, as Hideyoshi, the great Japanese warrior of the sixteenth century once actually proposed to do.

It was a Chinese philosopher who once said, that in this world of uncertainties there is nothing so certain as change. And this truism is applicable to the vast region of the Far East more extensively than anywhere else in the world. When we reflect that little more than a half century ago Japan was a country almost completely cut off from intercourse with the outside world and that within that half century, she has successfully fought single-handed two great wars, and as an ally of Great Britain in the greatest war of all wars, that she has been admitted to a place among the greatest Powers of the world and that by her alliance with Great Britain, she became the recognized leader of the Oriental races, we may realize something of the wonderfully dramatic changes that have contributed to the elevation of this nation to so high a pinnacle of fame and fortune.

During this period the Far East has been shaken by wars and revolts involving the expenditure of vast treasures of men and money; thrones have been overthrown and crowns have rolled along the pavements; striking changes in the geography of these regions have taken places, and violent transition has been the order of the day. The usual atrocities that mark all revolutionary changes and upheavals were by no means absent here, as elsewhere that we know of. It used to be the fashion to imagine that such forms of barbarism could only be prac-

tised among what were once called the barbaric nations of the East. But we know better now. We now cool down our indignation at these barbaric Eastern nations and merely record the fact that they fought among themselves and within themselves. China, absent-mindedly lost her dynasty, and got Yuan Shi-Kai in its place. Yuan became the head of the Chinese Republic, but pretending to believe that a Republican form of government was not suitable to the Chinese, tried to restore monarchy with himself as monarch. He failed and died, and the Republic of China still lives, albeit still in its birth throes.

All these changes have taken place in the Far East during this half century of Japan's transfiguration, and the last and greatest drama of all has been played out when the forces of Asia, Europe and America joined in common battle, against the Teutonic foe.

At no time within recorded history has there been such world-wide attention given to the affairs of the Chinese as at the present, and yet never has the world been entirely free from anxiety with respect to this great branch of the yellow race, or indifferent to its destiny. Today, the fate of this great country, whose inhabitants number one third of the world's population, hangs in the balance. Although the effete Manchu dynasty, which had ruled for two and half centuries, has been swept away before the forces of revolution, so far, no government has been set up to take its place that holds undisputed sway throughout China.

We are going to deal with questions, in the main, no further back than 1894-1895, when Japan defeated China and settled an issue long in doubt as to which of the two empires of the East was predominant. Three years later in 1898, America became more directly interested in the questions of the Far East by reason of her conquest of the Philippines from Spain. The Chino-Japanese war put an end, for the time being,

at least, to the dangers of the Yellow Peril, for it produced a breach between the two main branches of the Yellow Race and established Japan as a rival, a possible conqueror, but not as a leader of a combined attack of the Yellow Races upon the civilization of Europe. The conquest of the Philippines by America was likewise of great moment in shaping the future destinies of the Far East, for it brought the United States, as a colonial power, directly to the doors of Japan, and in its indirect effects led to the enunciation of the "Open Door" policy by Secretary John Hay in 1900.

Japanese success in her war with China was fraught with great consequences for the Far East, and very few, if any, of the far-seeing European statesmen of that day would have entertained the notion that out of it should arise a new Japan, that would before long involve the nations of the world in a contest over the question of her hegemony in Asia and her right to supremacy in the Pacific. The immediate consequences of Japan's aggressions were soon realized. Formosa, the valuable camphor-producing island of the South, was ceded to Japan, and Korea lost the protection of the Manchu dynasty. But these changes were but the introductory chapters, to which were soon destined to be added others of the principal body of the work, to wit, the events leading up to and the war itself with Russia. And this great completed work had likewise its immense sequel, the entire reshaping of the Far East at the hands of the Japanese.

The principal events of this ten year period (1895-1905) involved conflicts between Japan and other great European Powers—France and Germany, in addition to Russia—over the question of Japan's rights in Manchuria. Encouraged by the hope of future English support for her plans, Japan gave way, biding her time when she could deal with the question in a more advantageous manner. When, in 1897 and 1898,

all the great Powers who had opposed Japanese aggression in Manchuria, committed acts of similar aggression in their own behoof, the Japanese cup of gall was full to overflowing. The inconsistency of their attitude was too glaring to be overlooked, and is to a large extent responsible for the cynicism prevalent in Japanese statesmanship to this day. Britain alone, of the powers mentioned, maintained a loyal and consistent attitude, and made Japan look to her as a friend in whom she could rely for support in her contest for an independent position in Far Eastern politics. Then came the Boxer campaign in 1900 which was purely a contest directed against the "foreign devils" by over-enthusiastic and patriotic Chinese, who wanted to see adopted a sort of Chinese Monroe Doctrine reading, "China for the Chinese." Naturally the movement was a protest against the attempt of the powers "to divide, China up like a melon," and to partition her among themselves without so much as "by your leave," but its immediate effect was to establish Japan in a position of superiority because of the leading role she played in its suppression.

From this time forward Japan began slowly to emerge from her position of isolation, due to two circumstances of far-reaching importance. The first of these was the aggressive policy of Russia in the Far East, and her encroachment on the British sphere of influence in Central Asia. The second was of even further-reaching effect because it affected England's entire position of supremacy in the Far East. We refer to the new birth of the German Imperial Navy whose construction was started in 1898. This was the act that now set the crown upon England's determination to make an ally of Japan and withdraw her Pacific naval units to home waters, face to face with her new naval rival on the other side of the North Sea. Hence the Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902, and its various renewals in 1905 and 1911.

That we may understand the subsequent course of events out of which originated the deadly feud between Russia and Japan culminating in the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-1905, we must refer to a phrase, less than a half dozen of newly coined words, that was hatched in the brain of a nimble-witted European diplomat after a mid-night supper. "Spheres of influence" were the magic words used to describe a condition of things as indefensible as any acts of piracy ever committed on the high seas. Broadly speaking, these "spheres of influence" were divided as follows:—Great Britain in the Yangtse region, Russia in Manchuria and Mongolia, Germany in Shantung, Japan in Fokien, and France in a part of the region bordering upon Indo-China.

In these later days, since the great war, when the conscience of the world has been thoroughly awakened, when we are all looking forward to the dawn of a new era of right and justice to take the place of the old order of might and injustice, we may look back upon this conspiracy of the powers to strangle China and to divide her limb from limb as one of the immoral developments of a purely materialistic age that is past and gone forever, of an age in which the peoples were unable to organize serious opposition to the immoral tendencies of their ruling classes.

And yet, even then a voice was raised in behalf of poor humbled China, and strangely enough that voice is the same voice that now likewise takes the lead in calling aloud to the nations to follow in the path of righteousness and justice. It was the voice of America. In 1900, John Hay, American Secretary of State formulated the "Open Door" policy as a method, whereby, without strife among the nations, a measure of fair-dealing and uncalculating generosity might be displayed by the nations not only toward China but towards one another in their relations with China. The attempt at amelioration was made, but little came of it except broken promises, and the

Russo-Japanese war, fought because Japan charged Russia with setting at defiance the principle of equal treatment for all nations in Manchuria.

One reads in Confucius that there is a universal law that regulates the actions of mankind, whereby, in due course of time, every human act of committed injustice wreaks vengeance on the doer and the scales of justice are once more restored to their proper balance. "Law governs the universe," says the old Chinese sage, "but it is the law of right and not of wrong." And if Confucius were alive today he would point to the aggressions of the Powers in China in 1897-1898 as the cause of the Boxer uprising in 1900 and of the Russo-Japanese war in 1904-1905. That Nemesis has already overtaken one of China's wrong-doers, namely Russia, and is on the way to overtake another of them, to wit, Japan, would be to Confucius entirely certain. Russia's seizure of Port Arthur and Ta-lien-wan in 1898, resulted in her being driven from the Kwantung peninsula by Japan, and similar procedure by Japan in Kwantung, Shantung, Fokien and Inner Mongolia, together with her arbitrary action in imposing the "Five Groups" demands on China in 1915 will result in herself being driven forth, bag and baggage, from the Chinese domains. For, it is these foreign aggressions that have been the principal factor in awakening the national spirit of China, as signified in the Boxer uprising and in the rapid growth of the revolutionary spirit which has already advanced the cause of progress so mightily in China by overthrowing her decaying monarchical institutions and by substituting in their place the sound and wholesome organs of democracy and freedom. And the time is not far distant when China will emerge from her struggle to become a strong and united nation, and will snap the fetters that bind her as easily as Gulliver broke through the puny chains of his pigmy tormentors.

Upon the American continent the cry is, "Westward, the tide of Empire flows." But upon the continental expanse embracing Europe and Asia, the tide moves in a directly opposite direction and the West stretches forth its hands to the East. Indirectly, therefore it may be said that the cause of so many of the upheavals in the Far East has been due to the Empire building that has been going on incessantly, whereby an irresistible impulse has driven the nations of Western Europe to expand toward the East. Thus the Russo-Japanese war would not have been, but for the building of the great railway through Siberia which afforded a highway for the rapid transit of Russian forces to the uttermost limits of Eastern Asia. By building this gigantic highway across the continent of Asia, Russia may be said to have performed one of the most important tasks ever assumed by a civilized nation. For, by these means, she set up a bulwark against the aggressive designs of Japan to push forward the frontiers of the Yellow Man well on towards the borders of Eastern Europe. Against this Yellow Peril, Russia turned her broad back, and while she did not succeed in pushing the little men of the Land of the Rising Sun into the sea, she nevertheless succeeded in stemming the tide and in erecting, metaphorically speaking, the strongest of dykes against the flood that might have flowed over Europe had she not seen fit to bear so noble a part in sharing the white man's burden. Indeed it is possible to say of Russia what at one time Disraeli said of Austria, namely, that if she did not exist, it would be necessary to create her. And so it is, that a strong and united Russia is a necessity as a guarantee of the future peace of the world. Russia, in spite of all that may be said about the evils of her autocracy, was nevertheless well aware of the dangers she was going out to meet in her Eastward progress and never for a moment shirked the responsibility. On the contrary, prior to the breaking out of the great

war, Russia was conceiving and carrying out far-reaching plans for improving her facilities that were to be employed in opposing the aggressive designs of Nippon. We see, for example, that she was busy about doubling her existing railway tracks to the East, and was hastening to build a new line along the great Amur river, which was to give her communication with the shores of the Pacific through territories exclusively Russian (See, *The Problem of Japan*). Moreover, the State was doing all that lay in its power to people Siberia with sturdy pioneers, who in time of crisis might provide an army in strategic proximity to the scene of possible conflict. That her precautions were not at all premature or ill-advised is only too apparent when one follows out with a critical eye, the counter-moves on the political chess-board that have been made by the Japanese, for these include the creation of a wide-spreading web of communications and the distribution of settlers throughout her newly acquired territories in Manchuria and in Inner Mongolia. The attempt of the Japanese in the recent war to secure for themselves control of the railways in Northern Manchuria and the Maritime Province as a basis for operations, is too recent to require further comment.

Thus we see silently arraying themselves against one another the forces of East and West. Will they come to a clash, and how soon? These are questions that already are being asked even before a definite world peace has been signed, sealed and delivered.

Leaving the continental phase of the situation, as above outlined, we turn now briefly to the problems of the Pacific. Japan's triumph over Russia assured to her the naval supremacy she had desired in Far Eastern waters, and raised in an acute form the question of her attitude toward the British Colonies and the United States with respect to the Immigration Question. A great deal of the embarrassment that England

laboured under prior to the great war in taking a position by the side of her Colonies and the United States against the evils of Japanese emigration, has been done away with by reason of the fact that she now has no reason for restricting the size of her naval forces in the Pacific in view of the disappearance from the field, of Germany as a first class naval power.

Moreover she is no longer bound by her treaty with Japan because under the terms of her last alliance, the same is rendered inoperative against nations with whom either of the contracting parties had concluded a general treaty of arbitration, such as now exists between England and the United States. Then, there is the further fact of the League of Nations which it is expected, will automatically dispose of all existing treaties.

Japan is therefore face to face with a new situation. Hitherto, consistent cooperation between Great Britain and the United States had been impossible of attainment. Now, for both of these nations, the decks are cleared for action and they will pursue a Far Eastern policy based on the principles of right and justice enunciated by President Wilson that will put an end to the grabbing system, and to the methods of deceit, subterfuge and intrigue that have until now marked the actions of the Powers in these regions. What is equally significant for Japan is the fact that the new Russia, which will unquestionably be organized on democratic lines, will not suffer its government to pursue those plans of imperialistic expansion in the East at China's expense, which, for so long a time, bore the ear-mark of approval of Russia's now obsolete autocratic rule. And lastly comes the great new Republic of Germany, destined to play a role in the future reconstruction and rehabilitation of world affairs second to none, who will place herself side by side with America and England, and Russia too, if our

hopes of Russia's future regeneration are realized, and loyally support them in this crowning work of justice for all time—the establishing of a really free and independent China, secure and unimpaired in the fullest exercise of all her sovereign rights.

CHAPTER ONE.

The Coming Conflict in the Far East.

The isolation of Japan which, as we have seen, is a direct result of the failure of her diplomacy during the recent war, must inevitably lead to conflict. Unless Japan is prepared to make very great concessions to Russia the conflict must break out sooner or later between these two nations. To be sure the possibility exists that Japan can make an ally of Russia, particularly so, in view of the fact that Russia is a country where, so far as its form of government is concerned, the unexpected may at any time happen. It is quite conceivable that Japan will strain every nerve to restore such conditions in Russia as will make it possible for her to secure an alliance. Two important and far-reaching obstacles will stand in her way, namely, democratic tendencies of the new Russia which may prevent a proper and satisfactory understanding with an autocratically governed state, and secondly, financial considerations. The great Muscovite domains, enormously rich in natural resources, are without a sufficient supply of capital with which to develop them. The adequate development of Eastern Siberia is a task which Russia cannot accomplish single-handed. In other words, in order to realize her resources she stands in urgent need of working capital. Nowhere, under existing conditions, can she obtain the financial support that she requires except in England and America, and possibly in France. These are the countries who must become Russia's

financial sponsors for the immediate future, for Russia has important plans of development of her own, some of which are vital to her continued existence as a great nation.

If, therefore, we assume that the foregoing obstacles are insuperable objections to the creation of a Russo-Japanese alliance, then we may expect that Japan will take advantage of Russia's present weakness, to assure herself against the certain threat of future Russian expansion, and the dangers that lurk behind the Russian plan to double track her Siberian lines and continue them through all Russian territory along the line of the Amur river and into the Maritime Province by way of the Ussuri route terminating at Vladivostock.

The proposed construction of the Amur railway is a scheme of world-wide importance. America and England cannot remain indifferent to it, because the aim of its construction is in complete harmony with the measures taken in the United States and in the British Colonies to check the tide of Oriental immigration. The railway will extend the outposts of the white race's civilization to the outermost frontiers of the yellow men, and enclosing them as within a ring, prevent their overflow into the regions reserved to the European. Moreover, for Russia, the Amur Railway has other and equally compelling reasons for being called into existence and deserves our particular attention.

The Amur Railway project is evidence of a determination on the part of Russia to relieve her dependence upon the trans-Manchurian railway, and to avoid any complications that might arise in case of a breach of the Portsmouth Treaty which forbids the use of the Manchurian lines for military purposes. Russia cannot afford to risk having her only port in the Pacific cut off from communication with the interior, a policy which would result in isolating her valuable Maritime Province on the Pacific and lay it open to invasion before

troops could be concentrated for its defense, to say nothing of exposing all of Russia's vast territory of Eastern Siberia to conquest. The protection and defense of Vladivostock which can only be assured by means of such a strategic line of tracks as the Amur route would afford, is of vital importance to maintenance of the integrity of the Russian dominions. Without Vladivostock Russia is without a port answerable for a naval base and for her commercial interests in the Pacific. Now that the probability exists that Russian admission to the ports of the Baltic will be of a limited character, and only through the medium of the establishment of free ports, perhaps at Riga and Libau, and in view of the impossibility of her coping with her immense export trade through such ports as she possesses on the Murman coast and in the White sea, it is clear that even though Russia retains the Ukraine within her domains as an autonomous federated state, thereby giving her access to the Black Sea and the Mediterranean, she will suffer from a lack of open doors and windows to the outside world through which to pour her products; and the retention and full utilization of the facilities afforded by her routes to the East and through her rich Maritime Province, to the Pacific, becomes therefore indisputably clear.

But it is equally clear that Russia will have to fight to retain these advantages. Japan, through her possession of Korea, comes into possession of a frontier over which she may step into Russian territory, and she is in a position to have naval bases on the coast of Korea and not a day's steam from Vladivostock. Moreover, the island of Saghalien, of which Japan now occupies the southern half, lies closely parallel to the north-eastern coast line of the Maritime Province.

That Japan has her eye on the Province and on Vladivostock cannot be denied. She tried to obtain cession of the Maritime Province or as an alternative, the disarmament of Vladivostock,

in the Portsmouth Peace Treaty, and only failed because her position at the close of the war was not so sure and commanding as to permit of her insistence on these points in the face of Russia's determined refusal. Such a blow to her position as a great Power as would inevitably follow from any retreat by Russia from the Pacific at the instance of Japan could never be tolerated by the nation. Russia's war with Japan cost her the loss of not an inch of territory nor the payment of a single ruble by way of indemnity. It is not to be expected, therefore, that the Muscovite state which has once measured its strength with the Island Empire, resulting in a peace in Japan's favor, it is true, but with so little of advantage at Russia's expense, will ever shirk from trying new conclusions with its former foes, if these latter attempt to prevent the Russian bear from taking his bath in the waters of the Pacific.

It is clear, therefore, that the construction of an all-Russia route to Vladivostock is, paradoxically speaking, a peace measure that may have to be fought for. It is a measure that is required for the defense of East Siberia and the Maritime Province, and for the development of the vast resources of the opened territory. If it is objected to this plan that such a railway will facilitate the mobilizing of two or three million Russian soldiers in the Far East, the answer is that Japan is Russia's immediate neighbor there, and in the event of war can place two to three million soldiers in the field at short notice. Indeed, it was the inadequacy of her railway facilities in her war with Japan that lost Russia the war. Had the Siberian Railway at that time been double instead of single-tracked, Russia would, according to reliable military critics, have defeated Japan. It was only at the very end of the war that Russia was in a position to oppose Japan with an equality of forces. And from this experience, Russia has learned the lesson that she must double-track her lines all the way from Moscow to

Vladivostock and there can be no doubt that it will be done.

It is always to be remembered that the Amur Railway project is purely a Russian one. It has nothing to do with the invasion of foreign territory as in the case of the former route to the Pacific ports of Port Arthur and Dalny, through Manchuria, by way of the Chinese Eastern Railway, and can therefore furnish no pretext for international complications, but on the contrary will contribute greatly to the interests of the world at large, precisely as the development of its trans-continental railways has made of the Dominion of Canada a source of advantage to the rest of the world—what in large measure has been demonstrated during the war by the immense stream of supplies, provisions as well as war material, that flowed out of Canada.

The Amur River, which the railway will parallel, is one of the great waterways of the world, 2700 miles in length, and like the combined Missouri and Mississippi streams with which it may be compared in magnitude, is navigable throughout its whole course, and for upwards of 500 miles from its mouth in the Gulf of Tartary, steamers of 16-foot draught can ply their way unimpeded by any obstructions to navigation. Immense navigable streams, the Zeya, the Bureya, the Sungari and the Ussuri, flow into it. Indeed, it is estimated that the navigable waters of its basin extend to no less than 5000 miles, and that it drains, with its tributaries, an area of 800,000 square miles.

Such is the region which Russia will throw open to the world by the construction of the Amur route to the sea—a region as yet practically unknown but which competent investigators have pronounced to be rich in natural resources.

But aside from the ample resources of the river basin itself, the Amur Railway is justified on other economic grounds, inasmuch as it will establish a satisfactory means of communication with the rich Maritime Province, and will also tend in

large measure to the development of the whole of Far Eastern Siberia, where, in the words of M. Stolypin, "forty million acres of corn land" await the touch of man. Indeed the economic and strategical factors of the situation go hand in hand. Russia, to maintain her trade and prestige in the Pacific, must have an outlet to the sea. Forced back from the Kwantung peninsula and her former ports of Port Arthur and Dalny by the arms of Japan, Russia's only outlet is by way of the Maritime Province, which has therefore developed a strategical value of first importance. To render that strategical value permanent and secure, it is essential that the Province should also be developed in an economic direction, and to this end, nothing can conduce so much to successful results as the development of the transportation facilities of the Province combined with direct overland communication with the hinterland and direct all-rail connection with the home government. For the promotion of these objects, there must be founded communities and settlers, not only self-supporting but also contributory to the external trade of Russia, but without such a system of transportation and communication as we have outlined, every reasonable support would be lacking for establishing the foundations of such a development process. Necessarily in this process of empire-building the play of forces acts reciprocally. The railroad requires the colonization, and colonization requires the railroad. But of course there can be no doubt in this instance that it is the railroad that must come first, and that it is alone the railroad that will create the means for developing these vast domains and provide an outlet to the sea for a continent illimitable in its commercial possibilities.

In the foregoing, we have only attempted to exhibit one aspect of the coming conflict in the Far East. Other aspects of the situation are treated of in subsequent chapters.

CHAPTER TWO.

Japanese Diplomacy During the War.

Now that the war is over, and the interest of the world is no longer centered upon the life and death struggle being waged in the cock-pit of Europe, it refreshes the mind to turn to the events of the Far East and observe in retrospect, the drama that unrolled itself there during the four years that the Western nations had their attention absorbed by questions of defeat or victory. And speaking of defeat or victory, it is interesting to note, that up to the the time of the sudden and overwhelming overthrow of Russia and its emergence from the war, a defeated and broken nation, Japan's interest in the question of defeat or victory so far as her allies were concerned was exhibited as indifference. In either event she saw herself isolated, and cut off from any hope of outside aid in the projection and carrying out of her plans. For, in the one case, namely the victory of the Allies, she foresaw a drawing-together of England, Russia and France to divide the melon in the Far East with little if any regard for Japanese interests. On the other hand, in case of defeat, Japan forecasted the spread of German influence over the European and Asiatic continents with consequences just as fatal to Japanese hegemony in the Far East as in the case of the victory of the Allies.

That such was the trend of Japanese thought is apparent not only from a critical study of Japanese political tendencies

that could be made by any discerning historical student, but likewise from a very remarkable document that has come to light through the good offices of an Englishman who occupies a very important position under the present Chinese government. We refer to Mr. Putnam Weale. Mr. Weale has published in his clever and enlightening work, entitled *The Fight for the Republic in China* a number of very interesting documents bearing upon Japanese intrigues in the Far East during the war which display in a light as clear as the noon-day sun their entire program of action and the sinister methods by which they hoped to carry them out.

The principal one of the documents in question is a Memorandum, divided into two sections, containing the policy advocated by a Japanese secret society, called the Black Dragon Society.

Of this document Mr. Weale says: "The memorandum is the most remarkable document dealing with the Far East that has come to light since the famous Cassini convention was published in 1896."

The document bears every evidence of having been drawn up as the program of the militaristic party in Japan, to whom, from the beginning of the war, the necessity for a strong and bold policy toward China seemed the *ne plus ultra* of Japanese statesmanship. Witness the clever manner in which the militaristic party in Japan led by the most influential of the Genro statesmen, Prince Yamagata, constantly exerted its influence upon Count Okuma, the Premier and upon Viscount Kato, Minister of Foreign Affairs (1914—1916) to adopt a thorough-going jingo policy toward China. When Okuma and Kato hesitated and fumbled with the keys of power their fall was brought about, and Terauchi, a pure militarist, assumed the direction of affairs.

From the document aforementioned we shall now quote in

illustration of our contentions as to Japanese policies in the Far East.

PART. I. THE EUROPEAN WAR AND THE CHINESE QUESTION.

The present gigantic struggle in Europe has no parallel in history. Not only will the equilibrium of Europe be affected and its effect felt all over the globe, but its results will create a New Era in the political and social world. Therefore, whether or not the Imperial Japanese Government can settle the Far Eastern Question and bring to realization our great Imperial policy depends on our being able to skilfully avail ourselves of the world's general trend of affairs so as to extend our influence and to decide upon a course of action towards China which shall be practical in execution. If our authorities and people view the present European war with indifference and without deep concern, merely devoting their attention to the attack on Kiaochow, neglecting the larger issues of the war, they will have brought to nought our great Imperial policy, and committed a blunder greater than which it can not be conceived. We are constrained to submit this statement of policy for the consideration of our authorities, not because we are fond of argument, but because we are deeply anxious for our national welfare.

No one at present (about November 1914) can foretell the outcome of the European War. If the Allies meet with reverses and victory shall crown the arms of the Germans and Austrians, German militarism will undoubtedly dominate the European continent and extend southward and eastward to other parts of the world. Should such a state of affairs happen to take place, the consequences resulting therefrom will be indeed great and extensive. On this account we must devote our most serious attention to the subject. If, on the other hand, the Germans and Austrians should be crushed by the Allies, Germany will be deprived of her present status as a Federated State under a Kaiser. The Federation will be disintegrated into separate states and Prussia will have to be content with the status of a secondary Power. Austria and Hungary, on account of this defeat, will consequently be

divided. What their final fate shall be, no one would now venture to predict. In the meantime Russia will annex Galicia and the Austrian Poland; France will repossess Alsace and Lorraine; Great Britain will occupy the German Colonies in Africa and the south Pacific; Servia and Montenegro will take Bosnia, Herzegovina and a certain portion of Austrian territory; thus making such great changes that even the Napoleonic war in 1815 could not find a parallel.

When these events take place, not only will Europe experience great changes, but we should not ignore the fact that they will occur also in China and in the South Pacific. After Russia has replaced Germany in the Territories lost by Germany and Austria, she will hold a controlling influence in Europe, and, for a long time to come, will have nothing to fear from her western frontier. Immediately after the war, she will make an effort to carry out her policy of expansion in the East and will not relax that effort until she has acquired a controlling influence in China. At the same time Great Britain will strengthen her position in the Yangtze Valley and prohibit any other country from getting a footing there. France will do likewise in Yunnan province using it as her base of operations for further encroachments upon China and never hesitate to extend her advantages. We must therefore seriously study the situation, remembering always that the combined action of Great Britain, Russia, and France will not only affect Europe but that we can even foresee that it will also affect China.

Whether this combined action on the part of England, France and Russia is to terminate at the end of the war or to continue to operate we can not now predict. But after peace in Europe is restored, these Powers will certainly turn their attention to the expansion of their several spheres of interest in China, and, in the adjustment, their interests will most likely conflict with one another. If their interests do not conflict, they will work jointly to solve the Chinese question. On this point we have not the least doubt. If England, France and Russia are actually to combine for the coercion of China, what course is to be adopted by the Imperial Japanese Government to meet the situation? What proper means shall we employ to maintain our influence and extend our interests within this ring of rivalry and competition? It is necessary that we bear in mind the final results

of the European War and forestall the trend of events succeeding it so as to be able to decide upon a policy towards China and determine the action to be ultimately taken. If we remain passive, the Imperial Japanese Government's policy towards China will lose that subjective influence and our diplomacy will be checked forever by the combined force of the other Powers. The peace of the Far East will be thus endangered and even the existence of the Japanese Empire as a nation will no doubt be imperilled. It is therefore our first important duty at this moment to enquire of our Government what course is to be adopted to face that general situation after the war? What preparations are being made to meet the combined pressure of the Allies upon China? What policy has been followed to solve the Chinese Question? When the European War is terminated and peace restored we are not concerned so much with the question whether it be the Dual Monarchies or the Triple Entente which emerge victorious but whether, in anticipation of the future expansion of European influence in the Continents of Europe and Asia, the Imperial Japanese Government should or should not hesitate to employ force to check the movement before this occurrence. Now is the most opportune moment for Japan to quickly solve the Chinese Question. Such an opportunity will not occur for hundreds of years to come. Not only is it Japan's divine duty to act now, but present conditions in China favour the execution of such a plan. We should by all means decide and act at once. If our authorities do not avail themselves of this rare opportunity, great difficulty will surely be encountered in future in the settlement of this Chinese Question. *Japan will be isolated from the European Powers after the War**, and will be regarded by them with envy and jealousy just as Germany is now regarded. Is it not then a vital necessity for Japan to solve at this very moment the Chinese Question?

Aside from the substantiation of our contentions herein set forth there are three points that particularly strike the attention in the foregoing extract. Firstly, we note the repetition of

* The italics are ours.

the phrase expressive of the existence of a Japanese Imperial Foreign policy. There is nothing strange in and of itself, in any nation possessing a foreign policy, but in the Japanese case its designation as an *Imperial* Foreign policy gives rise to certain misgivings. Japan is in form a constitutional monarchy, but it is nevertheless, as we have taken the pains to point out in *The Problem of Japan* an autocracy in which ancient theocratic forms still survive, and provides every advantage for the fruitful sowing of ideas and methods of the most imperialistic and reactionary character. The real power in Japan, being in the hands of the Emperor and his small circle of aristocratic advisers, the Genro statesmen, members of his privy council, the adoption of a foreign policy, the ideas that govern it and the methods devised for its execution are in the nature of things an inheritance from the past, and accordingly if we study the past history of Japan prior to the inauguration of the exclusion period which commenced at the beginning of the seventeenth century and lasted until the middle of the foregoing century, we shall find a striking parallel between the foreign policies of Japan's most powerful warriors and statesmen of the sixteenth century, Nobunaga and Hideyoshi, and the foreign policy of the Imperial Japanese Government since the *Restoration* in 1868. This policy involves nothing less than the complete conquest of China and its subjection to the suzerainty of Japan.

The subject of the twenty-one, or "*five groups*" demands imposed upon China by Japan in 1915 has already been extensively referred to in *The Problem of Japan*. These demands were to be the opening act in a carefully composed drama, in the course of which China was to assume its harness bit by bit until it stood, at last, helplessly bound to Japan's chariot. And these demands were devised by whom? By the same master hands that composed the brilliant analysis of the political

situation at the opening of the great war which we have quoted above. Japanese methods require that such movements should originate somewhere outside the Cabinet or the inner circle of Genrō who exercise the real control. What more natural than that an esoteric cabal of highly placed militarists, whose expert, practical knowledge of means and methods would at once give to their proposals an extraordinary appearance of freedom from all visionary rhodomontade, should be entrusted with the task of devising the steps necessary to be taken for carrying out Japan's most cherished policy—the imposition of her will on China? Accordingly we find in the second part of the Memorandum above referred to, a carefully drawn up series of proposals which upon examination we find to be nothing less than the twenty-one demands in anticipatory form.

The second point that challenges our attention in the extract quoted, is the reiterated insistence on the existence of a Chinese Question.

It is true that there is a Chinese Question, and unfortunately it has to be admitted that it was not Japan but the great Powers of Europe who are to blame that there is such a question. Treaty ports, spheres of influence, economic barriers, extra-territorial rights, territorial leases and occupation of Chinese territory—all these and many other causes for which the great Powers are primarily responsible, have given rise to a Chinese Question. Japan has been, ever since her rise to power, an interested witness of the immoral attitude assumed by the Powers towards China, and quite naturally, in view of racial reasons, her proximity, her rapidly growing population and her economic necessities, has felt herself ill-used by those Powers who have undertaken to challenge her own superior right to settle the Chinese Question in her own way. And in the European war she saw her great opportunity. Which

brings us to our third point, namely the conception revealed in the Dragon Society's Memorandum, of the necessity of *forestalling the European Powers in the settlement of the Chinese Question.*

If there is one thing more than another that illustrates the practical wisdom of President Wilson's principles and of his insistence that right and justice in the settlement of world affairs can only be attained through the adoption of the principles upon which the League of Nations is to be based, then the consideration of how the Chinese Question is to be settled without strife must set the crown upon all the arguments that have ever been employed in support of these very much to be desired doctrines.

Let us now examine briefly how Japan proposed to carry out the forestalling process. A study of the "*five groups*" or twenty-one demands soon makes this clear. Without going into details that would only serve to confuse the reader unacquainted with the subtleties of Eastern modes of concealing thought and diplomatic method, we shall confine our analysis merely to elucidating the effect of the proposals, rather than to a literal rendering of them (For which, see *The Problem of Japan*).

(1) Accordingly, we find that *Group one* has to do with Shantung province newly conquered from the Germans. The effect of the provisions is to assure Japan a protectorate over the province, which of course, as in the case of Korea, should be the forerunner of complete annexation. China's sovereign rights are openly flaunted.

(2) Under *Group two*, Japan strengthens and consolidates her hold on South Manchuria and opens the way for a similar expansion into the vast adjoining Chinese territory of Eastern Inner Mongolia, under cover of rights granted to Japanese subjects to travel, reside and engage in business in the new

region. The "forestalling" is accomplished in two ways. Firstly, by securing to themselves rights not granted to other foreigners, and secondly, by securing to the Japanese, preferential rights with respect to loans and railway construction, and with respect generally to all political, financial and military questions affecting these regions.

Group three in the original "*five groups*" demands, is nothing less than a scheme for the conquest of the mineral wealth of the Yangtsze Valley, hitherto assumed to be exclusively the British sphere of influence in China. 7

Group four asked from China a declaration that she would neither cede nor lease to a third Power any harbour, or bay or island along the coast of China. This demand besides being an infringement of China's sovereign rights, likewise violated the treaty rights of other Powers and the principle of equal opportunity to which Japan had herself openly adhered in innumerable treaties not only with China but with the other Powers. The effect of the provision would be to constitute a virtual Japanese protectorate over China.

It is not, however, until we reach *Group five* that the climax of Japanese audacity stands fully revealed. A new "sphere of influence," the province of Fokien, that part of the mainland lying directly opposite to the island of Formosa ceded by China to Japan after her victory in the war of 1894-1895, is carved out. A web of railway communications is to be created in this region between the great Yangtsze river and the coasts of south China. But this was by no means all or even the most important terms of the proposal. Lurking behind demands for the introduction of Japanese hospitals, churches and schools, the demands for Japanese police supervision and the employment of Japanese police, the imposition of Japanese advisers in political, financial and military affairs, the requirements with respect to the purchase of munitions

from Japan—lurking behind all these subtly conceived provisions was the unalterable Japanese purpose to secure by these means the complete political conquest of China and to lay the last stone in a carefully reared edifice dedicated to forestalling the future expansion of European interests on the Continent of Asia.

For many weeks negotiations between China and Japan in connection with the twenty-one demands remained concealed behind a veil of secrecy and mystery, China being threatened with even greater repressive and coercive measures in case of resistance. But the facts leaked out. England, engaged in a life and death struggle at home, concealed her indignation at this flagrant breach of faith in her ally, but nevertheless went so far as to exert diplomatic pressure upon Japan to moderate her demands. America likewise voiced her disapproval. It was clear to everybody that these demands simply embodied an attempt on the part of Japan to rob China of her independence. The consequences to the great Powers of Europe and America could not be overlooked, nor could they afford to postpone to a later day the expression of their opposition to a scheme of unjustifiable and unprovoked conquest without its parallel in the history of the world. Accordingly, Japan retreated from her position, but only to the extent of agreeing to "detach *Group five* from the present negotiations and to discuss it separately in the future."

It would be a work of supererogation for us to examine further into the famous twenty-one demands and Japan's intentions with respect thereto. Never in all history has a clearer example been offered of the evils of secret negotiations and of secret diplomacy. Had it been possible, in view of the critical situation of affairs in Europe at the time these demands were made, for Japan to have exerted sufficient pressure upon China's government, or by intrigue to have overthrown the existing

government and to have set up a puppet rule of her own prepared to be amenable to her will, China's fate would have been sealed. Both contingencies were open to Japan and both were attempted. On the one hand Yuan Shih-Kai was insidiously approached with an intimation that in case he supported Japanese designs he could rely on Japanese support to maintain him in power against the opposition of revolutionary Chinese organizations and even to restore the monarchy with Yuan as Emperor. On the other hand, Japanese agents supplied the revolutionaries with money, munitions, leadership and men and in various provinces incited revolts and provoked bloodshed. All of these attempts were, however, destined to be exerted in vain. Publicity put an end to the whole business and the newspaper correspondents saved China from a fate worse than Korea's.

But this is only one of several mis-reckonings made by Japanese diplomacy during the course of the war which have resulted, in spite of all her exertions to obtain the whip-hand in China, in the total bankruptcy of her carefully devised diplomatic program.

Firstly, as has been noted, Japan failed in her efforts to establish in China a government subservient to her purpose. The ebb and flow of her influence in high circles only served to strengthen the purpose of patriotic Chinese to hold fast to true republican ideas, to maintain and develop the republican and constitutional form of government and to trust in the justice of their cause to free them from the curse of foreign interference. And now for the first time in her history since the fall of the Ming dynasty in 1644, China sees a ray of hope in the fact that all the nations of the world are looking forward to a new era of right and justice. These principles have seldom been applied to China in her dealings with the Powers, but now that the conscience of the peoples of the

world has been awakened, China has a right to hope that she too will be treated as a worthy member of the family of nations among whom there shall in the future be no room for such acts of exploitation and aggression as have been meted out to China in the past.

Japan's second great disappointment was the entrance of the United States into the war. This was a complete surprise to the Japanese who had deluded themselves with the idea that the United States was given over utterly to money-making and materialism, and absolutely fixed in its pacifist tendencies. And American intervention did not at first greatly impress the Japanese. They did not believe that it was possible for America to carry through the necessary measures to make her aid effective. Accordingly in the first months after America intervened, Japanese diplomacy still maintained a lofty and rather arrogant tone which displayed itself most pronouncedly at a banquet in New York given to Baron Ishii, the accredited head of a Japanese mission to the United States, sent to negotiate the settlement of certain outstanding questions between the two countries, at which the Baron had the audacity to announce the doctrine of "Asia for the Asiatics" to an audience composed of leaders in commercial and financial circles, some of whom had taken part in the raising of loans and the construction of railroads for China at the express invitation of the Chinese who have always looked upon Americans as their friends.

Nor was President Wilson's enunciation of principles which was to become the formula for making peace, received with any approval in Japan. The idea of a League of Nations and its accompanying principles of enforced arbitration for international disputes were particularly distasteful to the nation that had been straining every nerve for years to expand both army and navy to the utmost limit of the nation's resources. And

of course, the principle of self-determination was the equivalent of a slap in the face to Japan who had gone to war for the sake of conquest and now saw herself threatened with a loss of the spoils because America, as she saw it, was idiotic enough to commit herself to an unselfish policy. It is indeed unfortunate that Japan did not borrow her diplomatic instead of her banking system from the United States.

Thus we see in American intervention, the cause of new disaster to the Japanese political program in the Far East. A country which at the beginning of the war had not even been a recognizable quantity in the consideration of the influences that would predominate at its termination, had now become at one stroke the *deus ex machina* and had set at nought the calculations of Japan's cleverest statesmen.

But Japan's cup of bitterness still continued to overflow. When the mighty empire of Russia was broken into fragments as a sequence to its revolution and the powers of democracy gained a final triumph over autocracy, Japan saw disappearing into thin air, her vision of a future alliance with the Czar's government and one that might secure her against the dangers of an isolation which she saw looming up in the distance with the greater certainty now that all the English speaking nations were joined under one banner to contend with a common foe. It did not fit in with the Japanese plan that Russia alone of the big Allied nations should meet with overthrow and defeat, and a democratic Russia was not thinkable as a future ally of autocratic Japan. The falling out of Russia simply completed Japan's isolation, for it left the Chinese Question in a situation that boded ill for Japanese hopes of being able to set off one power against the other when it came to a settlement after the war. No conflict of interests could be hoped for as between America and England. It could only be expected that these two countries would pursue

a common aim in the Far East, and then to crown all, English naval supremacy became at one stroke what it was prior to the time that Germany began to build a fleet.

Surely, the Dragon society was right when it urged that it was necessary for Japan to solve the Chinese Question and to solve it quickly. It foresaw with prophetic foresight the situation that would confront Japan at the close of the war if she failed to solve it right—that is to say, to place herself in such a position with respect to China as to enable her to shut out forever the attempt of Europe and America to have a hand in the matter. And Japanese failure to solve the Chinese Question is due in very large measure to a factor that has helped China to solve her greatest problems during the past twenty or thirty centuries namely the vastness of the Chinese domains. But this is a subject that requires separate study and is not within our province to discuss. We content ourselves with assuring the reader that he will find if he examines the subject historically that all so-called conquests of China have been, except in one or two instances for short periods of time, purely nominal. The so-called absolutism of the Manchu dynasty, in reality rested upon pure fiction. Distant provinces were united to the home government by the very lightest and flimsiest of ties—perhaps some light contributions of money or grain. In all other respects, they were in everything but name independent commonwealths.

So much is clear, that the Chinese Question can never be rightfully solved by any but the Chinese themselves. For a comparatively small nation like Japan to attempt it, was to attempt the impossible, and yet in all fairness it must be admitted that she had to attempt it. Her destiny required it. Her obligations to her own posterity made it a solemn and sacred duty.

CHAPTER THREE.

Pro-Wilson Or Anti-Wilson.

When the Peace Conference was summoned together to meet at Paris it was generally supposed that the object of the Conference was to make peace. History does not record of any such gathering ever having been convoked for any other purpose. Nearly all great conferences that have met after a war between the nations have usually made some pretence of doing something quite different from what actually happened when the question of the division of the spoils was reached in the course of the debates, resolutions and decisions formally taken. Thus even the Congress of Vienna which probably serves as the classic example of a peace that was settled on the most materialistic of bases, was inaugurated by Castlereagh, who of all the statesmen there gathered was perhaps with the possible exception of Metternich, the chief embodiment of the reactionary and militaristic spirit, with a speech in which he extended to the world the hope of the dawn of an era of perpetual peace on earth. Nevertheless the Vienna Congress actually did settle down to the real business in hand and actually did make peace without too great delay.

What we see now going on at Paris is, however, something totally different. Primarily the question of closing a final peace seems to occupy but a secondary place in the thoughts of the conferees. Indeed, it is recognized that the question of making

peace is not the first object of the conference. It is said that we are living in a new age and that the day when a Castle-reagh, with his tongue in his cheek, could make all sorts of lofty promises to a listening world, promises that were never even to be taken seriously, has passed away.

Accordingly when President Wilson states that the chief item on the program of the Conference is to establish for all time a new world era, the peoples every where look on with entirely different feelings from what they were wont to do in the days of the dynastic wars and conflicts arising out of some impending threat to the balance of power.

The peoples themselves and not monarchs, generalissimos, premiers and foreign ministers, have decided that certain ideals for which they have made their sacrifices shall now no longer be considered in the abstract, but that they must be realized in the concrete. From every quarter of the globe, men and women are saying their say and demanding that the ideals embodied in President Wilson's program for a League of Nations shall go into fulfillment.

The peoples have learned something in these last four years of war. They have learned about the great armament firms existing in every one of the great nations, some of them with interlocking directorships that include organizations in countries with which they may at any time be at war. Think for a moment of what it means to have the engines of destruction, the means by which whole nations may be wiped out of existence, in the hands of a private concern and controlled by a board of directors of private individuals whose interest is to make profits, and the greater the profits, the greater the success of the undertaking—profits every cent of which in time of war is blood money! Such institutions as these are in their very nature a source of danger to every state. They are in reality institutions whose only reason for existence is to promote

war. If society had in its midst an organization formed to promote the dissemination of disease, we are sure that the danger of such an organization would be at once recognized and steps be immediately taken for its suppression. Yet we have permitted similar organizations to exist in our midst and have failed to recognize their presence until a world cataclysm brought it home to the threshold of every household.

And so from evil number one, we pass to evil number two—conscription. In the same way that professional munition-makers work for the promotion of war, so likewise do the conscript armies. War is their profession, that is, provided that they are something more than a well-disciplined force organized to keep the internal peace of the country. One does not create an organization of street-sweepers in a city except for the one purpose of sweeping the streets, nor an organization of fire-fighters for any other purpose than to fight fires. It would be just as absurd to expect that a great army is created to keep the peace, as to assert that the street-sweepers or the fire-fighters are organized for purposes other than those specified.

And yet trite as the facts may appear to us to-day, it cannot be said that their truth was universally recognized until now. So blind have we all been!

Let us take another instance. For over fifty years it has been recognized by military experts, statesmen and other students of the subject that the agencies for making war were growing more and more destructive. The new discoveries in the mechanical and chemical laboratories left no doubt in the minds of thinking persons, that should any new war break out, it would be accompanied by a wholesale destruction of life and property on a scale hitherto unheard or undreamt of. But in spite of this knowledge, shared by all the chancelleries of the world, were any steps taken to prevent the breaking

out of such a war? No, on the contrary, steps were taken by each nation to outdo its neighbor in improving on the efficacy and destructiveness of its war implements. To the peoples of the earth whose thoughts have been awakened by the soul-stirring events of the recent war, realization of such a fact as this has occasioned such a welling-up of indignation at the old order of things as has seldom been seen in the history of the world. And they have made up their minds that such things shall never be again. It is true that while in all countries there is manifestly a strong popular desire to see President Wilson's program realized in its fullest scope, the desire is not *equally* strong in all countries, and in some, the wish for the realization of some temporary materialistic gain or greed for a share of the spoils, has outweighed considerations of right and justice and respect for the interests of humanity in general. Indeed it may be said that among the great nations, the only "thick and thin" supporters of President Wilson's policies will be Great Britain, America, China and Germany.

As to the other nations, while all of them want a League of Nations in the abstract none of them seems to want it to interfere with its own particular interests. It is a beautiful ideal, says Rumania, as it reaches out its hand for Transylvania on one side and Bessarabia on the other. Just the thing, says Italy, but of course it must not rob us of the desirable things we claim to pick up in Dalmatia, in the islands, in Asia Minor and in Southern Tyrol. Let us have it by all means, says Poland, but only after we have appropriated Galicia, Posen and the Ukraine and established a through connection to Danzig. We entirely approve, says France, but of course we must have the Saar Valley, Alsace-Lorraine, pickings in the East and extensions in Africa—to say nothing of exclusive control in Morocco. We are all for it, say the Czecho-Slovaks,

but what are those Poles doing prowling about those nice mineral areas that belong to us and who are these Germans of Bohemia who want self-determination; self-determination is a beautiful thing—for us. It is a noble thought, say the Japanese, and we shall support it with all our strength just as soon as our right to Kiaochow and the German islands in the Pacific, is fully recognized.

And right here, there are some who may object that we have failed to include Great Britain among the nations that are making these mental reservations with respect to the League of Nations and they will point to Britain's expectations with respect to the German Colonies, Mesopotamia, and Arabia and her attitude toward Ireland.

And our answer is that England has whole-heartedly accepted President Wilson's principles and is going to make the necessary sacrifices to carry them out. With respect to the German Colonies the acceptance of the principle of control by a mandatory or trustee who shall be under the ultimate disposition of the League of Nations, does not shut out Germany from at some time regaining control of her colonies, as trustee or mandatory under the League of Nations. Those who think that President Wilson's principles, or the practical application of them, admit of a different theory, will find themselves mistaken. President Wilson knows only too well that the rights of Germany will have to be respected, and that, if they are not respected, we shall only have established new grievances in the place of old, and transferred the whip of tyranny from this hand to that instead of destroying it altogether. He does not require to be taught that it is mere hypocrisy to brand the terms Germany imposed on France in 1871 or those which she imposed on Russia at Brest-Litovsk, as infamous, if the spirit of these terms is to be imitated and outdone to-day.

Let us take England's position with respect to Ireland. It is true that English rule in Ireland has become impossible on any basis except that of military occupation, calling into being what is practically a relation of conqueror and the conquered, a relation wasteful and humiliating for both, and which would reduce all English professions of respect for President Wilson's principles to contempt if England had any intention of persisting in her ancient policy toward Ireland. For it is doubtful whether any subject people in Europe has repudiated an external system of government with such unanimity and emphasis as the Irish have done. And if England were to continue to resist the doctrine of self-determination in its most intimate affairs, it could not with decency pretend to be its champion in the affairs of other people. But England knows that the continuance of her friendship with America is a necessity to her, and that she can never hope permanently to retain the friendship of America so long as the Irish question remains unsolved and that only when a settlement is made satisfactory to the Irish people will there be full and complete accord between the two great English speaking nations. Accordingly England perceives that the only method of escape from an impossible situation is to give her adherence to the League of Nations which will afford an opportunity of giving a lead to the world and a guarantee that the new relationship between the two countries will be established on a basis of security and good will. In other words England having to make her choice between the friendship of Sir Edward Carson and the friendship of America, will undoubtedly choose the latter.

And right here the gentle reader is going to ask, what has all this to do with the isolation of Japan? And the answer is not far to seek. For while it is true that so many of the nations have not as yet whole-heartedly given their adherence to President Wilson's principles, it is a fact almost beyond

question that all of these recalcitrant nations, with the single exception of Japan, will be forced by public opinion to adopt all and singly the views of President Wilson and of his loyal supporters in England, Germany and China. Our reason for holding this opinion is that the principles in question receive their strongest support from the spirit of international co-operation manifested in nearly every country through labour, trades-union and social-democratic organizations who are imbued with the idea of establishing the solidarity of the "plain people" throughout the world. The influence of this movement is of a very far-reaching character in practically every nation with the sole exception of Japan.

In Japan, the teachings of socialism can never thrive among the masses of the people because socialism is fundamentally antagonistic to Japanese ideas both in regard to the inviolability of the Throne and the duty of the citizen towards the state. Furthermore, Japan's autocratic government will exert all its power to prevent the spread of what it considers pernicious doctrines. The laws having for their object the preservation of peace vest the police with autocratic powers; before a political party can be organized, the consent of the executive authorities must be obtained. Moreover, newspapers and other publications may be suppressed, and associations dissolved by the police. Incidentally, it may be mentioned that a number of years ago a Socialist organization was formed on the lines of the famous Fabian Society in England of which Bernard Shaw is a member and one of the organizers. Owing to the opposition of the authorities, all attempts to organize a party have completely failed, while a number of journals have been peremptorily ordered to cease publication because they contained articles which, in the opinion of the police, were likely to cause breaches of the peace. One well known Japanese publicist has declared that under the pretence of preserving industrial

peace the Government suppresses every party aiming at the reform of society, and that it hinders labour movements at every step instead of providing for the protection and elevation of the working classes. "In these respects," adds the same writer, writing in 1912, "our Government is certainly fifty years behind the Russian Government."

Another factor worth considering in this connection is the low standards of the Japanese labouring classes as compared with the European or American workman. Competent investigators have declared that Japanese labour is altogether inferior to white labour—that it is not capable of the same production, and that it is not nearly so efficient. With conditions such as these it is not surprising that the Japanese workman is so far behind his European and American confrere in promoting his own advantage through social and economic organization. And this is not at all strange when we consider that the Japanese working people have emerged but only yesterday, so to speak, from the influences of a feudalism which labelled a large section of the community "non-humans." The labouring classes having no political power, the attitude of the Government towards them has been one of cynical indifference, and to this day, while the horrible conditions of slave labour have been abolished, serfdom to a certain extent still remains. Local reform has been sacrificed to the raising of armaments and to militarism is to be attributed most of the wrongs and evils from which labour suffers so greatly in Japan.

Accordingly, we see that with conditions so different from those prevailing in Europe and America, there is not much to be expected from out Japan, so far as any popular movement is concerned, that shall influence the government as in other countries more democratically governed, to modify its views in the interests of a change in international diplomacy and international politics. But when in addition to such aims, we

hear President Wilson and his supporters actually proposing to change the old world order in the interest of humanity in general, one does not need to be a prophet to predict that Japan will have nothing to do with such ideas, because having so much neglected to do anything for humanity at home, she can not be expected to have much sympathy for the interests of humanity at large. *bring you*

When Japan has reformed its antiquated constitution, has given the people a real voice in the government, has made its Ministry answerable to a parliament elected by the people under modern suffrage conditions, and has purged the State of its attachment to the principles of divine right and theocratic rule, then, but not till then, it will be possible to hope for the participation of Japan in a movement for the amelioration of the conditions of humanity throughout the world.

With these considerations in mind, we confidently assert that the position of Japan, as a direct result of her own reactionary institutions, and as an indirect result of the establishment of democracies in Russia and Germany, will be one of complete isolation.

CHAPTER FOUR.

China's Wrongs.

One of President Wilson's leading principles as announced by him in one of his speeches runs to the effect that the relations between one nation and another ought to be regulated in accordance with the same ethical or moral principles which appertain in the case of relations between individuals.

How far the nations of the world have departed from any such principle as this that President Wilson has laid down, may be witnessed with striking clearness in the case of China and her relations with the great Powers.

No nation in the world has ever suffered such wrongs, nor has less deserved to suffer them. She has been punished because she is big and because she is powerless, or rather because she has been unwilling to return evil for evil. No nation has a more glorious national history, glorious in the sense of high deeds of the spirit rather than of physical might, and her civilisation, although as unlike as possible to the Western type, is nevertheless as distinctive and progress-forming for all mankind.

In the future treatment of China by the world, justice demands that the same governing principles that are applicable to the adjustment of international differences in Europe or America shall likewise be applied to China. Diplomatic methods of procedure, of the old school, that in one breath, and speaking in the abstract, addressed her communications to China as an

independant and sovereign nation, and in the next breath stole away her right so to be called by robbing her of her sovereign rights in concrete cases—such methods must, if justice is to be done, be abolished forever.

The attempt to secure economic advantages in China by means of subtly conceived plans that are ostensibly meant to aid China financially, but which in reality have concealed behind them insidious designs that are concocted with the aim of establishing a sort of financial imperialism over her, must be thrown overboard, and all economic barriers be leveled to the ground.

Such anomalies as Treaty Ports and "spheres of influence," are no longer to be permitted, for they are in derogation of the territorial integrity and dignity of an independent and sovereign state. China is now awake and will no longer suffer such affronts to her national worthiness, and if any of the Powers are so blind as to think that they can bridle the mighty but latent forces of this land by measures of force, they are some day bound to have a sharp awakening.

After such wrongs as China has suffered, who is there that would dare to champion a different policy than that which we have herein outlined, for to catalogue those wrongs is but to remind the nations that the only reparation they can make is to see to it that at last justice be done.

Among the wrongs to be righted, are the following:—

a. All the so-called "leased territories" must be returned to China. These include Kiao-Chau, Port Arthur, Talienwan, Kwang-Chou-Wan, and Wei-Hai-Wei.

b. Outer Mongolia, over which China's right has been reduced to a mere fiction of suzerainty as the result of Russian instigation in 1912, when China was at a critical moment during her revolution (see, *Problem of Japan*), should be restored to China's full sovereign control.

c. Outer and Inner Tibet is an integral part of China. Any attempt to detach it from the mother-land should be prevented.

d. Concessions to Japan as a result of her twenty-one demands of 1915, together with the privileges previously acquired by her in Manchuria, in so far as they impair China's sovereign rights, should be declared null and void.

e. Foreign garrisons stationed at various places in China should be immediately withdrawn. Their very presence is an insult to a free and independent nation.

f. Boxer indemnities exacted far beyond the actual injuries done to the foreign nations, should be cancelled altogether. America has already done so. Justice demands that enormous sums still outstanding should be used to better advantage than as mere subsidy to concession-seekers.

g. China as a sovereign nation has the right to fix her tariff rates. The present treaty limitations are incompatible with this principle and accordingly should be abolished.

h. All the railway mining and other concessions should be so amended as neither to violate China's sovereign rights nor to impair her free economic development.

i. Treaties heretofore entered into through force or duress, threat or intimidation, are incompatible with China's sovereign rights, and should be equitably revised.

The foregoing by no means exhausts the list of wrongs from which China has suffered in the past. The list embraces only such wrongs as have been committed since 1897 by every great Power in the world, America alone excepted. Of all the nations America is the single nation that has shown herself China's disinterested friend. America presented China with the principle of the "Open Door" policy and President Wilson will unquestionably revivify that principle when the time comes for regulating the problems that are awaiting settlement in the

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Far East. America likewise displayed her friendship for China when she returned the excess indemnity fund arising out of the Boxer troubles, and when she recognized the Republican government of China in the critical days when others were seeking for concessions, and in 1913 President Wilson displayed real statesmanship as well as friendship for China, when he caused America, alone of all the great Powers, to depart from the policy of reaction and obscurantism hitherto employed by the European governments in their transactions with China, and refused American participation in the great Reorganization Loan because he held that the terms on which it was to be granted infringed on China's sovereign rights.

It is a good augury of the times that China no longer has to appeal for disinterested support and friendship to one single nation. The changes brought about by the world war will affect China in no inconsiderable degree. New groupings of the Powers will give her new protectors, and she may now confidently rely, not only on America's good-will and active support but likewise on the good offices and helping hand of those other nations who are loyally supporting President Wilson's policies—England and the great Republic of Germany, destined soon to play a peaceful role in world affairs far surpassing anything she has done in the past.

In connection with the subject matter of this chapter, it may not be out of place to touch somewhat more fully than we have done, upon that one of the wrongs done to China that finds its echo elsewhere in the world. We refer to the question of private investments in foreign fields. There is no single topic that has the right to receive more of the attention of the Peace Conference and particularly of that section of it which is laying the foundations for a future League of Nations, than this one. It is one of the very important problems we must solve if the future stability of international life is to be maintained.

That some decisive pronouncement of policy should now be made at the Peace Conference with respect to this subject is only too clear in view not only of the international complications that have arisen in the past through the old policy of granting national protection to purely private enterprise which has frequently led to the shedding of a nation's blood to guarantee investors the profits from their investments, but we perceive the necessity of taking an immediate stand against those old abuses, in the fact that already certain very notable capitalistic forces are bestirring themselves in urging their governments to lend support to the old measures.

For example, not long since, Mr. William S. Kies, a Vice-President of the National City Bank of New York, America's greatest financial institution, published an article from his own pen in *The Nation* (New York) on *Foreign Investments after the War*. The article is written from the standpoint of the foreign investor and contains an astonishing advocacy of the return to measures of protection of capital invested in foreign lands such as have been the fruitful source of international strife, sometimes leading to the brink of war—Morocco and China, are flagrant examples—so frequently witnessed in the past, and which we had supposed the new conscience of the world was consigning to an oblivion that knows no resurrection.

We do not mean to say that there may not be some international control of the amount, destination and application of capital. On the contrary, such a system, if safe-guarded by proper checks established by the executive powers of the League of Nations, would have in it the seed from which could grow an honest and wholesome policy in all foreign investment. But we do take issue with Mr. Kies' suggestion that he wants Governments, and particularly the American Government, to give protection to private investors in foreign fields. He says that bankers of the United States should be

free to make both political and non-political loans, and describes political loans as "loans carrying with them port or harbor concessions with powers of administration and the collection of charges; the granting of large areas of land for purposes of exploitation with complete power of control and government; the giving of franchises for the giving of important and strategic railways, conferring upon the lender complete control in the management and administration; and the granting of monopolistic privileges of various kinds."

The advocacy and adoption of measures such as these simply means that the world may never look forward to an era of rest and freedom from strife. But why, we rise to ask, must an investor in such foreign undertakings be given a preferential standing over an investor in local enterprises and in the face of what extraordinary complications may ensue? In the one case, he is given government backing with all that implies, and in the other, he takes his own risk and must rely for the safety of his venture on the ordinary contractual obligations and on their enforcement by the law of the land administered by the civil courts of justice. Why cannot the investor in foreign fields take his chances like any other investor? Indeed, governments are themselves to blame, influenced by the temptation to secure new political "spheres of influence" under the guise of protecting the commercial interests of their nationals. And it is this condition of affairs that must cease, if the principles of the League of Nations are to have any practical value.

The solution of the problem lies, we believe, in international control of investment in China, Morocco and other countries similarly situated and in such colonies as those in Africa. The natural resources of these lands must, to be sure, yield their stores to the generality of men; but there should be no profiteering, no taking of loot by exploiting investors. Capital

should be provided by Governments through a central agency. Native inhabitants should be adequately paid for all labour performed, and just compensation should be made for the products and raw materials carried out of their land. This policy would be sound. It would rob no one and would be just to all.

We now come to the consideration of the leading outstanding cases between China and the foreign Powers, and first of all, of the thorny questions that have arisen between China and Japan arising out of the treaty of 1915 between those countries, with respect to South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia, under which special rights and privileges were given to Japan in those regions.

Ever since about the year 1911, the Japanese have been establishing police boxes in different parts of South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia always under protest of local and Peking authorities. Since the treaty of 1915, the Japanese have been liberal in the advancement of pretexts for the exercise of this control, such as the right of mixed residence given to Japanese subjects in these regions, the necessity of protecting and controlling such subjects, to prevent disorder clashes with the Chinese, and finally it is contended that the stationing of police officers is but an exercise of the right of extraterritoriality, and that it is in no way a derogation of Chinese sovereignty.

The Chinese Government, on the other hand, point out that in the treaty of 1915, express provision is made for Japanese in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia to submit to the police ordinances and laws and taxation in China. By the express provisions of the treaty, therefore, the Japanese are accorded every facility for assisting the Chinese authorities in the orderly administration of the law and the preservation of the public peace. Other foreigners reside and transact business in China and are adequately protected by the law of the land.

They have never desired or requested any other protection than that afforded by the Chinese Government. Nor are the activities of these foreign police confined to their own countrymen, for in a dispute between a Chinese and a Japanese, both will be taken to the Japanese station by the Japanese policeman. Thus there has been created, by the establishment of foreign police on Chinese soil, a sort of *imperium in imperio*, which is in sharp derogation of China's sovereign rights. It is true that right is exercised in foreign settlements and concessions, but there it is by express permission of the Chinese Government, and foreign governments have never claimed any other basis for the right than the granted permission of the Chinese Government, and least of all have they ever claimed, as do the Japanese, that the right of police is a natural corollary to the right of extraterritoriality.

Secondly, we have to deal with the controversy existing between China and Japan over the legal status of the Korean farmers who have been granted special privileges as regards residence and the ownership of land in the Yenchi region of Manchuria, just across the boundary line between China and Korea, in return for which the Koreans were to be subject to the jurisdiction of Chinese laws and courts. These special privileges were granted to the Koreans with the assent of Japan under an agreement entered into in 1909 when Korea was a Japanese protectorate. This agreement was adhered to by the Japanese after the annexation of Korea in 1910 and up to the year 1915, at which time the Japanese authorities intervened and claimed jurisdiction over these Koreans. The object of the intervention was only too plain, for the Koreans greatly outnumbered the Chinese population in this region and the only thing that kept the region Chinese territory in fact as well as in name was the possession by the Chinese of jurisdiction over every inhabitant, whether Chinese or Korean.

Were China to surrender jurisdiction over a majority of these inhabitants, it would be tantamount to a cession of territory.

The Japanese claim is based on the Treaty of May 1915 respecting South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia, Article 5 of which provides that civil and criminal cases in which the defendants are Japanese subjects shall be tried and adjudicated by the Japanese Consul. A careful examination of this treaty discloses, however, that the existence of the 1909 agreement above referred to is recognized as remaining "in full force and virtue." This effectually disposes of the Japanese claim without mentioning other weighty reasons in favor of the Chinese contention such as the granting of concessions and other valuable considerations to the Japanese by the Chinese in 1909 in return for the Japanese promise to respect the Koreans in the Yenchi region. This, of course, from a legal standpoint constitutes a unilateral contract between the two parties which it would be incompetent for either party thereto afterward to impair.

Thirdly, we come to the long standing dispute between China and Portugal over the Macao question. It may be necessary to remind some of our readers that Macao is a city situated on an island of the same name at the mouth of the Canton River.

By a protocol signed at Lisbon on March 26, 1887, China formally recognized the perpetual occupation and government of Macao and its dependencies by Portugal, as any other Portuguese possession; and later when the formal treaty was signed, provision was made for the appointment of a Commission to delimit the boundaries of Macao; "but as long as the delimitation of the boundaries is not concluded, everything in respect to them shall continue as at present without addition, diminution or alteration by either of the Parties."

A dispute having afterwards (1908) arisen over the status

of the territorial waters surrounding Macao and with respect to various encroachments of the Portuguese beyond the limits of the original Portuguese possession of Macao, the matter was referred to Demarcation Commissioners of the respective Governments for decision in pursuance of the provisions in the treaty between the parties hereinabove referred to. Negotiations were begun at Hong Kong in 1909 and were afterwards transferred to Lisbon where political events have thus far delayed a "meeting of the minds."

Fourthly, we have the important differences between Great Britain and China over Tibet. We cannot do better than to quote verbatim a memorandum on this subject drawn up by Dr. C. C. Wu, Councillor at the Chinese Foreign Office, as follows:—

"In November, 1911, the Chinese garrison in Lhasa, in sympathy with the revolutionary cause in China, mutinied against Amban Lienyu, a Chinese Bannerman, and a few months later the Tibetans, by order of the Dalai Lama, revolted and besieged the Chinese forces in Lhasa till they were starved out and eventually evacuated Tibet. Chinese troops in Kham were also ejected. An expedition was sent from Szechuan and Yunnan to Tibet, but Great Britain protested and caused its withdrawal.

"In August, 1912, the British Minister in Peking presented a Memorandum to the Chinese Government outlining the attitude of Great Britain towards the Tibetan question.

China was asked to refrain from dispatching a military expedition into Tibet, as the re-establishment of Chinese authority would, it is stated, constitute a violation of the Anglo-Chinese Treaty of 1906. Chinese suzerainty in regard to Tibet was recognized. But Great Britain could not consent to the assertion of Chinese sovereignty over a State enjoying independent treaty relations with her. In conclusion, China was invited to come

to an agreement regarding Tibet on the lines indicated in the Memorandum, such agreement to be antecedent to Great Britain's recognition of the Republic. Great Britain also imposed an embargo on the communications between China and Tibet via India.

"In deference to the wishes of the British Government, China at once issued orders that the expeditionary force should not proceed beyond Giamda. In her reply she declared that the Chinese Government had no intention of converting Tibet into another province of China and that the preservation of the traditional system of Tibetan government was as much the desire of China as of Great Britain. The dispatch of troops into Tibet was, however, necessary for the fulfillment of the responsibilities attaching to China's treaty obligations with Great Britain, which required her to preserve peace and order throughout that vast territory, but she did not contemplate the idea of stationing an unlimited number of soldiers in Tibet. China considered that the existing treaties defined the status of Tibet with sufficient clearness, and therefore there was no need to negotiate a new treaty. She expressed the regret that the Indian Government had placed an embargo on the communications between China and Tibet via India, as China was at peace with Great Britain and regretted that Great Britain should threaten to withhold recognition of the Republic, such recognition being of mutual advantage to both countries. Finally, the Chinese Government hoped that the British Government would reconsider its attitude.

"In May, 1913, the British Minister renewed his suggestion of the previous year that China should come to an agreement on the Tibetan question, and ultimately a Tripartite conference was opened on October 13, at Simla with Mr. Ivan Chen, Sir Henry Mc Mahon and Lonchen Shatra as plenipotentiaries representing China, Great Britain, and Tibet, respectively.

"The following is the substance of the Tibetan proposals:—

1. Tibet shall be an independent state, repudiating the Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1906.

2. The boundary of Tibet in regard to China includes that portion of Sinkiang south of Kuenlun Range and Altyn Tagh, the whole territory of Chingkai the western portion of Kansuh and Szechuan, including Tachienlu and the northwestern portion of Yunnan, including Atuntzu.

3. Great Britain and Tibet to negotiate, independent of China, new trade regulations.

4. No Chinese officials and troops to be stationed in Tibet.

5. China to recognize Dalai Lama as the head of the Buddhist Religion and institutions in Mongolia and China.

6. China to compensate Tibet for forcible exactions of money or property taken from the Tibetan Government.

"The Chinese Plenipotentiary made the following counter-proposals:—

1. Tibet forms an integral part of Chinese territory and Chinese rights of every description which have existed in consequence of this integrity shall be respected by Tibet and recognized by Great Britain. China engages not to convert Tibet into a province and Great Britain not to annex Tibet or any portion of it.

2. China to appoint a Resident at Lhasa with an escort of 2,600 soldiers.

3. Tibet undertakes to be guided by China in her foreign and military affairs and not to enter into negotiations with any foreign Power except through the intermediary of China but this engagement does not exclude direct relations between British Trade Agents and Tibetan authorities as provided in the Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1906.

4. Tibet to grant amnesty to those Tibetans known for their pro-Chinese inclinations and to restore to them their property.

5. Clause 5 of Tibetan claims can be discussed.
6. Revision of Trade Regulations of 1893 and 1908, if found necessary, must be made by all the parties concerned.
7. In regards to the limits of Tibet China claims Giamda and all the places east of it.

The British plenipotentiary sustained in the main the Tibetan view concerning the limits of Tibet. He suggested the creation of Inner and Outer Tibet by a line drawn along the Kuenlun Range to the 96th longitude, turning south reaching a point south of the 34th latitude. then in southeasterly direction to Niarong, passing Hokow, Litang, Batang in a western and then southern and southwestern direction to Rima, thus involving the inclusion of Chiamdo in Outer Tibet and the withdrawal of the Chinese garrison stationed there. He proposed that recognition should be accorded to the autonomy of Outer Tibet whilst admitting the right of the Chinese to re-establish such a measure of control in Inner Tibet as would restore and safeguard their historic position there, without in any way infringing the integrity of Tibet as a geographical and political entity. Sir Henry Mc Mahon also submitted to the Conference a draft proposal of the Convention to the plenipotentiaries. After some modification this draft was initialled by the British and Tibetan delegates but the Chinese delegate did not consider himself authorized to do so. Thereupon the British member after making slight concessions in regard to representation in the Chinese Parliament and the boundary in the neighborhood of Lake of Kokonor threatened, in the event of his persisting in his refusal, to eliminate the clause recognizing the suzerainty of China, and *ipso facto* the privileges appertaining thereto from the draft Convention already initialled by the British and Tibetan plenipotentiaries. In order to save the situation, the Chinese delegate initialled the document, but on the clear understanding that to initial and to sign

were two different things and that to sign he must obtain instructions from his Government.

"China, dissatisfied with the suggested division into an Inner and Outer Tibet the boundaries of which would involve the evacuation of those districts actually in Chinese effective occupation and under its administration, though otherwise in in accord with the general principles of the draft Convention, declared that the initialled draft was in no way binding upon her and took up the matter with the British Government in London and with its representative in Peking. Protracted negotiations took place thereafter, but, in spite of repeated concessions from the Chinese side in regard to the boundary question the British Government would not negotiate on any basis other than the initialled convention. On July 3 an Agreement based on the terms of the draft Convention but providing special safeguards for the interests of Great Britain and Tibet in the event of China continuing to withhold her adherence, was signed between Great Britain and Tibet, not, however, before Mr. Ivan Chen had declared that the Chinese Government would recognize any treaty or similar document that might then or thereafter be signed between Great Britain and Tibet.

"China's Standpoint. With the same spirit of compromise and a readiness to meet the wishes of the British Government and even to the extent of making considerable sacrifices in so far as they were compatible with her dignity, China has more than once offered to renew negotiations with the British Government but the latter has up to the present declined to do so. China wants nothing more than the re-establishment of Chinese suzerainty over Tibet, with recognition of the autonomy of the territory immediately under the control of the Lhasa Government; she is agreeable to the British idea of forming an effective buffer territory in so far as it is consi-

tent with equity and justice; she is anxious that her trade interest should be looked after by her trade agents as do the British, a point which is agreeable even to the Tibetans, though apparently not to the British; in other words, she expects that Great Britain would at least make with her an arrangement regarding Tibet which should not be any less disadvantageous to her than that made with Russia respecting Outer Mongolia.

"Considering that China has claimed and exercised sovereign rights over Tibet, commanded the Tibetan army, supervised Tibetan internal administration, and confirmed the appointments of Tibetan officials, high and low, secular and even ecclesiastical, such expectations are modest enough, surely. At the present moment, with communication via India closed, with no official representative or agent present, with relations unsettled and unregulated, the position of China *vis à-vis* Tibet is far from satisfactory and altogether anomalous, while as between China and Great Britain there is always this important question outstanding."

The most recent notable phase of Allied "non-interference" in China is the agreement reported to have been "reached in Tokio," to establish an "Inter-Allied" committee to supervise the Trans-Siberian Railway including *the Chinese Eastern Railway*. The committee will, it is said, be headed by a Russian "presumably selected by the Kolchak Government at Omsk" and will include one representative each of China, Japan, the United States, France, Great Britain and Italy. Under this main supervisory committee will be a military board and a technical board, the latter probably, under the direction of the American railway expert, John F. Stevens.

The significance of this agreement does not seem to be

well-understood by those who have hitherto discussed the matter. Otherwise usually well-informed circles express some surprise that, after months of negotiations and rumoured jealousies in which was particularly manifested Japan's alarm over the danger of an extension of American influence, suddenly and by some unexplained means Japanese suspicions and objections were overcome and the agreement signed.

It does not seem to have struck even the more liberal and radical sections of the Inter-Allied press that the project of the Powers to internationalize the Chinese Eastern Railway and its adjoining territory is an even grosser violation of China's sovereign rights than the control exercised by Russia and Japan over the South Manchurian Railway and its adjoining territory, for the reason that its tendency is to recognize and perpetuate the foreigner's claim to a right of interference in matters that are of purely Chinese concern, and to condemn to utter impotence any action or opposition on the part of the Chinese Government who will now be powerless to do more than protest against the united action of such an overwhelming combination of great Powers.

Under what pretext have the Powers again committed themselves to interference in the internal affairs of China? Those who are at all familiar with the situation in China must acknowledge that in those foreign settlements that have been freely and voluntarily sanctioned by China, and administered by her, there exists as little reasonable ground of complaint, on the part of the foreigner, as regards either the security of his person and property or the guarantee of free trading facilities, as in the international settlements themselves. Accordingly, there is but one conclusion to be drawn from this new action of the Powers, namely, that the internationalizing of the Chinese Eastern Railway is not called for by the requirements of foreign trade, but is dictated by certain ones of the great Powers

who, in the pursuit of purely imperialistic aims, are seeking to keep China in a state of political subjection.

And in the light of these considerations, it is not difficult to understand the reason for Japanese acquiescence in the plan. For, hitherto, the Powers now joining with Japan and Russia in this policy of interference, in this invasion of the sovereign rights of China, have been to the fore in denouncing a similar policy of interference and invasion of rights on the part of Russia and Japan in South Manchuria. What wonder that the Japanese have sanctioned an agreement which apparently gives them every claim to insist that thereby the formers champions of China's territorial integrity have waived every right to oppose the perpetuation of Japanese control over Southern Manchuria.

CHAPTER FIVE.

A DEFUNCT ALLIANCE.

France—Russia—Japan.

One of the greatest threats to the future peace of world that has arisen since August 1, 1914, has been the revival of French chauvinism and the rebirth in France of a spirit of Imperialism for which one has to go back to the days of Napoleon for a parallel. It is not alone since the close of hostilities that this spirit began to manifest itself, but we are able to point to certain far-reaching projects entertained by France in the midst of the war which have hitherto remained entirely unnoticed by the organs of public opinion.

The fall of the Czar and the disappearance of the old Russian régime together with the adoption of new democratic tendencies in Russia, were nowhere received with less enthusiasm than in France. And the reason for it is by no means to be attributed to anxiety on the part of the French for the security of their Russian loans, nor was it due to misgivings with respect to the effect on the war's outcome that Russia's possible defection might have. So far, at least, as France's rulers is concerned, the seat of their worry and disappointment lay in the fact, that France feared for the future of her alliance with Russia, and particularly for the dislocation of certain plans that had been under consideration, if not actually reduced to paper, having relation to a new French alliance with Russia

which should include Japan as a member of the partnership.

Furthermore, it is believed that the invitation to join the new *entente* did not originate with France but (strangely enough as some of our readers may think) with Japan. What then was to become of the Anglo-Japanese alliance?

As the author has already pointed out in *The Problem of Japan*, the new treaty between Japan and Great Britain executed in 1911 contains the following provision— "Should either High Contracting Party conclude a Treaty of General Arbitration with a third Power, it is agreed that nothing in this agreement shall entail upon such Contracting Party an obligation to go to war with the Power with whom such Treaty of Arbitration is in force." This provision created a weak spot in the treaty between the two countries and soon after its inclusion in the newly signed treaty, Japanese statemen perceived the necessity of steering the bark of state upon a new course. Accordingly Japan turned to Russia and reached an understanding with that country that guaranteed mutual support in their further designs on the territorial integrity of China. Such understanding was in due course of time embodied in two agreements, the first of which (1911) provided for the settlement of all outstanding questions, and the second (July 1912) contained provisions with regard to their respective spheres of influence in Mongolia, and an undertaking for the joint defense of those spheres in case of attack by other Powers.

Thus by the signing of these treaties with Russia, Japan received a powerful reinforcement to her policy of aggrandizement in the Far East, and the new Russo-Japanese *Entente*, established for the purpose of anticipating any interference with their plans for the partitioning of China's northern dependencies, virtually took the place of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and made Japan more than ever the master of her own fate.

But not content with this, Japan, during the course of the

recent war entered into a new Treaty with Russia (in 1916), the secrecy of which was so well kept that no intimation of it reached the outside world until the prying eyes of the Bolsheviki regime unearthed it and it was published to the world along with other interesting disclosures. The terms of this new agreement provide that neither Japan nor Russia will be a party to any arrangement or political combination directed against the other. The two powers pledge themselves, in case the territorial rights or special interests in the Far East of either, which are recognized by the other, should be threatened, they will take counsel together with regard to the adoption of measures for safeguarding and defending those rights and interests.

To understand still more clearly what the object of this agreement was, it must be borne in mind that the keystone of Japan's policy is her determination to attain to absolute supremacy in the Far East, and to this end she has conceived that nothing is so necessary as the disruption of China and the distribution of the fragments among those nations who participate with her in the disruption process.

Now Japan is keen enough to know that no one nation in the world is equal to the task of swallowing China. Any nation that should be foolish enough to try it on, would soon find itself suffering from a severe case of indigestion. China, then, is too big for any one nation to manage, not only because of its immense population of over 400,000,000 souls, but likewise because of its immense areas. But China could be strangled if the right measures were taken to get a firm hold on the victim's throat, and by pressure to cause him to expire from want of air.

An examination of the map will show that Japan and Russia between them had already obtained an almost perfect strangle-hold upon the victim. Japan's hold begins with the

island of Formosa which is far south of a middle line dividing China into a northern and a southern section, and from here onward she possesses a group of small islands that stretch out like a chain of fetters in a northeasterly direction to the very threshold of Japan. Japan's possession of Korea and her occupation of the Kwantung and Shantung peninsulas give her control of the approaches of the Yellow Sea and finally she has completely in her grasp the Gulf of Pechili through which the outside world makes its entrance to China's capital. This encirclement of China is continued to the north by Japan's occupation of Manchuria and her encroachments in Eastern Inner Mongolia. Russia joins hands with her in this region and to the west of it, for she has turned Mongolia into one of her own spheres of influence. Indeed with the numerous encroachments made upon China's sovereignty in Manchuria and Mongolia, she still retains very little of her authority in these regions.

But again, if you look at the map, you will observe that the cordon about China is not yet quite complete. To the south of the Japanese sphere of influence, in the coast province of Fokien opposite the island of Formosa, lie the great province of Kwangtung with its very important city of Canton, and the provinces of Yunnan and Kwangsi. If these provinces should fall into the hands of an enemy allied with Japan and Russia it meant that the noose was lifted over the head of the victim and securely adjusted about his neck. And accordingly France is invited to join the alliance because strategically she is in the best position to overrun these provinces with French troops from the French colony of Indo-China, just across the border.

Coming events always cast their shadows before. Whenever the Japanese, in their ambitious plans for the disruption of China, make a new move in the direction of forcing new demands on her, they always prepare the order of events by

stirring up a revolt or a police riot somewhere in Chinese territory, in respect of which, of course, it always, turns out that her own innocent nationals have been terribly maltreated by some "horrible Chinese bandits" or overpowered by some lawless troop of "ferocious Chinese soldiers." Thereupon follows a show of great force by the Japanese Government, demands for reparation in which they always manage to include some new measure impairing Chinese sovereignty in a particular region, and then they retire from the scene to prepare for the next act.

Similarly, the French having made up their minds to a policy of aggression in China began in 1916 to look about for the means of stirring up an atmosphere of irritability between the two countries, knowing full well that out of the smallest incidents there may be evolved a train of events that leads to strain and then to a complete rupture of relations.

In November of the year 1916 occurred the famous Laohsikai affair which took place in Tientsin and created a storm of rage against France in North China which even yet, it is said, has not abated. The Laohsikai dispute involved a question of a bare 333 acres of land in Tientsin and we herewith give a report of the affair in the words of an eye witness of the trouble, Mr. Putnam Weale.

Says Mr. Weale:—In 1902 the French consular authorities in Tientsin filed a request to have their Concession extended on the ground that they were becoming cramped. The Chinese authorities, although not wishing to grant the request and indeed ignoring it for a long time, were finally induced to begin fitful negotiations; and in October, 1916, after having passed through various processes of alteration, reduction, and re-statement during the interval of fourteen years, the issue had been so fined down that a virtual agreement regarding the administration of the new area had been reached—an agreement which the Peking Government was prepared to put into force subject to one

reasonable stipulation, that the local opposition to the new grant of territory which was very real, as Chinese feel passionately on the subject of the police-control of their land-acreage, was first overcome. The whole essence or soul of the disputes lay therein: that the lords of the soil, the people of China, and in this case more particularly the population of Tientsin, should accept the decision arrived at, which was that a joint Franco-Chinese administration be established under a Chinese Chairman.

When the terms of this proposed agreement were communicated to the Tientsin Consulate by the French Legation, the arrangement did not please the French Consul-General, who was under transfer to Shanghai and who proposed to settle the case to the satisfaction of his nationals before he left. There is absolutely no dispute about this fact either—namely that the main pre-occupation of a consular officer, charged primarily under the Treaties with the simple preservation of law and order among his nationals, was the closing-up of a vexatious outstanding case, by force if necessary, before he handed over his office to his successor. It was with this idea that an ultimatum was drawn up by the French Consul General and, having been weakly approved by the French Legation, was handed to the Chinese local authorities. It gave them a time-limit of twenty-four hours in which to effect the complete police evacuation of the coveted strip of territory on the ground that the delay in the signature of a formal protocol had been wilful and deliberate and had closed the door to further negotiations; and as no response came at the end of the time-limit, an open invasion of Chinese territory was practised by an armed French detachment; nine uniformed Constables on duty being forcibly removed and locked up in French barracks and French sentries posted on the disputed boundary.

The result of this misguided action was an enormous Chinese outcry and the beginning of a boycott of the French in North China,—and this in the middle of a war when France has acted with inspiring nobility. Some 2,000 native police, servants and employés promptly deserted the French Concession *en masse*; popular unions were formed to keep alive resentment; and although in the end the arrested police were set at liberty, the friendly intervention of the Allies proved unable

to effect a settlement of the case which at the moment of writing (November 1917) remains precisely where it was a year ago.

Mr. Weale's account of the Laohsikai affair must now be supplemented by a further illustration of the action of French diplomacy in China, which goes still further to fortify the proposition we have set out to prove, namely, French designs against China, in co-operation with Russia and Japan.

In April 1917 France lodged a protest against the building of a railway in Kwangsi Province (which as the reader will remember borders on the French Province of Tongking in French Indo-China) by American engineers with American capital—France claiming *exclusive rights* in Kwangsi by virtue of a letter sent by the Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs to the French Legation in 1914 as settlement for a frontier dispute in that year. The text of that letter is as follows:—

“The dispute that rose in consequence of the disturbance at the border of Annam and Kwangsi has been examined into by the Joint committee detailed by both parties concerned, and a conclusion has been reached to the effect that all matters relating to the solution of the case would be carried out in accordance with the request of Your Excellency.

“In order to demonstrate the especially good relations existing between the two countries, the Republican Government assures Your Excellency that in case of a railway construction or a mining enterprise being undertaken in Kwangsi Province in the future, for which foreign capital is required, France would first be consulted for a loan of the necessary capital. On such an occasion the Governor of Kwangsi will directly negotiate with a French syndicate and report to the Government.”

As regards the foregoing protest, aside from throwing a side-light on the value of France's repeated formal adherence by treaty to the policy of the "Open Door" and equal opportunity for all nations in China, French action in this case, coming at the very time when America was rushing to the assistance of France to help her in her war with Germany and save her from impending destruction, must be regarded as having been dictated by a policy to which France had committed herself and which she was bound to adhere to because of her obligations under her understanding with Japan. Indeed the French attitude is precisely on all fours with the oft-repeated action taken during the war by Japan, against the interests of the United States in China, and it cannot be regarded in any other light than as emanating from a fixed policy arrived at as the outcome of a mutual understanding between Japan and France.

And now coming down to very recent events we are able to understand the animus behind the bitter opposition expressed in France to any recognition of or understanding with the Bolsheviki Government in Russia. We are also able to understand why France, in the strife of the various antagonistic elements in Russia has invariably thrown in her lot with the old reactionary elements, with Sasonof and Admiral Kolchak who are working for the restoration of the monarchy in Russia.

How mockingly hypocritical seem France's alleged reasons for refusing to have anything to do with the Bolsheviki! The Bolsheviki are supposed to be wallowing in the blood of their fellow-citizens, according to French assertion, and their fashion of making revolution is not to French taste because of its ruthlessness and total disregard of human rights.

The author confesses to having recently re-read Carlyle's *History of the French Revolution*, and he advises the gentle reader who desires to be able to form a just estimate of the

value of French protests against the Bolsheviki to re-read that work also. It is true that comparisons are odious and in this particular case, comparisons would be particularly odious to France, for we challenge any one to find in the authentic accounts of Bolsheviki atrocities anything that can compare with the atrocities of the French during the Reign of Terror—and it was all done in the sacred name of Liberty, Equality and Fraternity.

In this regard it is pleasing to note the contrasting attitude of a large section of the British public as disclosed in the comments of the British liberal press. Such great newspapers as the *Daily News*, the *Manchester Guardian* and the *Westminster Gazette* have warned their readers repeatedly of the danger of being misled because of false reports emanating from Russia. This has had a good effect on the British public and has been of use in bringing public opinion around to favor President Wilson's idea of trying to find some basis for uniting the various Russian parties in some action that shall lead to peace and order in that country. France, however, still persists in her reactionary politics, because for her the establishment of a democratic régime in Russia means the end of her dreams of an alliance that was to be the stepping-stone to her acquirement of a great Colonial Empire in the Far East.

Nor is it for naught that the French press have encouraged the discussion of all questions that might serve to wound the sensibilities of the Netherlands—for to the Netherlands belong the Dutch East Indies, one of the richest Colonial possessions in the world and it was part of the compact between Russia and Japan to which France adhered that the Dutch East Indies were to be handed over to Japan in requital for Japan's aid during the war. The "secret documents" published in Russia confirm this fact (Telegram of Sasonof in February 1915).

With Japan supporting French claims in Kwangsi, Yunnan and Kwangtung, and France supporting Japanese claims in the Dutch East Indies, the bargain was quite complete.

That these plans have, momentarily at least, been allowed to drop is due solely to the defection of Russia. If France and Japan should succeed in restoring the monarchy and the old diplomatic régime in Russia, all of the old plans will once more emerge from the storage to which the exigencies of the moment have temporarily dismissed them. Paralysis has stricken the once great firm of *France, Russia, Japan & Co.*, due to the bankruptcy of one of the partners, and the world awaits the further developments of the liquidation with a watchful eye.

CHAPTER SIX.

More Secret Treaties.

We have referred in the preceding chapter to the conspicuous part played in the diplomatic game by the secret treaty entered into by Russia and Japan in 1916 and have given some inkling of the nature of France's participation therein and of what expectations she hoped to see fulfilled through the medium of her new political partnership. We have also seen how all these well-laid plans came to naught, and as a result it is necessary for both France and Japan, so long as they in secret continue to adhere to their old beliefs in such things as alliances, a balance of power, secret diplomacy and political intrigue, to seek new combinations and new groupings of the powers and by such means free themselves from the dangers of isolation. New states are being formed out of the ruins of the old. There will be a new Yugo-Slav state under the hegemony of Serbia; a new Czecho-Slav state under the leadership of Bohemia; a new Palestina; a new Arabia or state of the Hedjaz; a new Armenia, a new Finland and a new Poland—all of these to be newly created out of peoples that had no independent political existence prior to the war. To these may be added other new states to be carved out of the Russian body politic, in the event that circumstances are unfavourable to the creation of a Federal Union out of such new political entities as the Ukraine, Siberia, and the Baltic provinces, with

such remaining portions of the Muscovite domains as still remain true to the idea of a united Russia.

We have by no means attempted to exhaust the possibilities with respect to the creation of new states but only to suggest such as now seem reasonably secure of sanction by the Peace Conference. And it will now help us to understand what new international relations may come to exist if we look into the question of what possible causes of friction have already been disclosed as existing among the Powers who are attempting to settle all matters in dispute in a manner that shall not give rise to future dissensions in Europe. To this end it is instructive to take a look at another one of the secret treaties entered into by certain of the great Powers during the course of the war.

In February 1917 a secret treaty was concluded between Great Britain, France and Russia fixing spheres of influence for those countries in Asiatic Turkey. In this same treaty France was also granted the right of possession of the Saar Basin in Germany, the great coal area on the left bank of the Rhine.

This treaty, which France now insists shall be upheld (in spite of the new situation created by the defection of Russia) in recognition of her claims in Asiatic Turkey, has given rise to friction between France and England because of the fact that France is resisting the English plan by which her dominant position in Syria is to be threatened by the separation of Palestine from Syria. A somewhat minute examination of the agreement will be of interest.

The agreement recognized the creation of an independent Arab state or of a confederation of such states. After fixing the Russian sphere of influence, it was recognized that France should receive the Syrian coast, the Vilayet of Adan, as well as a region limited in the south by the line Aintab-Mardin

up to the future Russian frontier and north by a line running through Ala Dagħ, Cesarea, Ak Dagħ, Yildiz, Dagħ, Zara, Egui, Kharput. Great Britain acquired the southern portion of Mesopotamia, and in Syria the ports of Haifa and Acre. The point of view of the French is that their claims in Syria are such that they can only be met by treating Syria as a separate entity. Those claims are based on the peculiar position which anti-Clerical Republican France holds as protector of Catholic interests in the East. France has ever been jealous of her situation in Syria, and has, in spite of all her anti-Clerical campaigns, sought to maintain the moral influence she exerts in those parts through the many charitable, religious and educational institutions she has created. There are, moreover, a number of very solid economic advantages which France is naturally anxious to protect. Syrian trade is almost entirely in French hands and it is French capital which began supplying the country with railways and roads.

Not only are Clemenceau and the French Imperialists irritated by the proposition to separate Palestine from Syria, thereby carving away one of the most important members of the Syrian body but they are likewise annoyed at British recognition of the claims of the Hedjaz.

The French point of view is briefly that while the Hedjaz is a small country, its appetites are big. It claims all the Arabian-speaking territories of the Ottoman Empire as its own, including Syria and Mesopotamia, and thus the two capitals of Arab civilization, Damascus and Baghdad would fall under Beduin sway.

The Paris *Temps* reviewing the brief history of the Hedjaz, which is mainly the creation of British influence, asks whether the sovereignty of the Hedjaz would really be a symbol of Arabian independence, whether the Hedjaz would be really fitted by its own resources to administer the vast region it claims.

The journal points out that during the war, the Governments like Serbia and Montenegro, which were in exile, have received the *collective* financial support of the Allies in the general interest, but asks whether that is the case of the Hedjaz; whether the Hedjaz is not really bound by special obligation towards one of the big Powers—meaning of course Great Britain.

To the *Temps* writer the remedy is simple and will consist in refraining from making the Hedjaz the centre of a "factitious and fictitious Empire." The right which will be given to the Hedjaz over Syria (the writer goes on) would be a lasting cause of friction between the Allies themselves. The Syrian would have both a guardian who would be the French Government, and a suzerain who would be the King of the Hedjaz, and any one seeking to foment discontent would appeal to the suzerain against the guardian—in other words, to British influence against that of France.

The British point of view is influenced to some extent, on the one hand, by historical considerations and, on the other, by the desirability of having a safe neighbor on the flank of Egypt protecting the approach to the Suez canal from the direction of that part of the Asiatic Continent adjoining Africa, and this can be accomplished by creating in the independent state of Palestine, a neutral territory, that stands right athwart the old time hallowed route to Egypt which constitutes the only practical avenue of invasion of Egypt from the north and one that has been repeatedly employed by world conquerors both in campaigns spoken of in the Bible, and in later times.

From the historical point of view the British draw attention to the fact that the Arab Empire at one time extended from Baghdad to Cordova in Spain. That it possessed the most liberal form of Government that existed in the world from the time of the decline of the Roman Empire down to the rise of European civilization in modern times. All this arose from

the Hedjaz. The Arabs who are closely related to the Jews and have a similar history, had a culture of their own. When the Jews lost their nationhood, the Arabs stepped into their shoes as the leaders of Semitic thought. The Arabs fell victim to the great Mongul invasion, and their power fell in turn to the Turks who by way of the Arabs inherited the Jewish tradition and preserved what of it was of cultural and humanitarian value. Besides the Jews and the Arabs, one other people lost their nationhood in this region, namely, the Armenians. And now all three of the peoples, the borders of whose fatherlands so closely touch one another, are to be restored to nationhood, and it is believed that the future of this region and of the entire East, in large measure depends upon them and the manner in which they may compose their rivalries and strive towards the co-operation of their powers and talents for the consummation of the higher aims of humanity. It is believed that the future of the new Jewish state in Palestine will to a great extent depend upon what relations it may maintain with its neighbors. And what so natural as that the new Jewish state should resume its former relations with the Arabs. The Arabs have historically always borrowed a great deal from the Jews, and there is no reason to doubt that the future Arab state will continue to borrow much from them. In this way the Jews will find a territorial outlet for their abilities wider than Palestine. But to this end it is absolutely essential that Jewry should have its full inheritance in Palestine. Such is the British standpoint and it seems quite irreconcilable with the French.

Differences between the Powers like those above set forth have been accumulating ever since the inauguration of the Peace Conference, and it is of importance to mention them in connection with the question of the isolation of Japan, because this lack of unity and these causes of friction always

leave open the possibility that a permanent cleavage may come in the hitherto friendly relations of former allies and give rise to the creation of a new combination of states, allied for offensive and defensive purposes, to which Japan may seek refuge as an escape from the threatening dangers of isolation. Even Poland may some day become an international factor of great importance, in view of the fact that France will seek to make a strong nation of the Poles and at German expense if possible, as a counterpoise to the loss of her ally Russia.

New sources of friction and of possible war also exist in the differences between Italy and the new Yugo-Slav State growing out of the promises made to Italy in the secret Treaty of London, of which Serbia, although her interests were particularly involved, was kept in complete ignorance until after the cessation of hostilities. Serbia's demands, which are in direct conflict with those of Italy, require that her frontiers should be westerly and northerly, the Adriatic Sea, including the Dalmatian coast with its islands, the Croatian coast and its islands, Fiume and Istria. She wishes to see united under the Serbian Crown all of Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia, Dalmatia and Montenegro. With Italy demanding on her part, Fiume, Istria, the Dalmatian coast, Trieste and the islands to which her rival lays claim, all as a part of a bargain agreed to in the London Treaty, we may understand Serbia's bitter disillusionment since her discovery of how domains to which she claims to have the prior and the better right, by her sufferings and under the nationality principle, have been bargained away behind her back. And the same may be said with respect to her objections to the secret treaty entered into with Rumania in 1916 and said to have been drawn up by the French Premier Briand. Under this treaty Rumania was promised certain parts of the Banaat of Temesvar which, as the Serbians say conflict with century old claims of the

Serbians in this region. The Banaat would no doubt be a very profitable addition to Serbia as it is very fertile, and mountainous Serbia possesses very little arable land. Moreover it is rich in various minerals, gold, silver, copper and coal. In view of the conflicting claims, it is possible that the referees at the Peace Conference may decide that less future trouble will be caused if it is simply returned to its former Hungarian owners, particularly in view of the already very large claims of Serbia elsewhere which we have already noted and of the enormously overdriven pretensions of Rumania which include annexation of Transylvania, Bessarabia and the Dobrudscha, to none of which she possesses a clear title on either ethnic or geographic grounds. If all of her demands were granted, Rumania would attain to a very superior and overmastering position in the Balkans, as against which both Serbia and Greece would have the strongest reason to object, to say nothing of what a rehabilitated Bulgaria may stand for at some later time.

Greece, in turn, claims the so-called "Greek strip" in Asia Minor, a territory that is bounded by a line passing on the northwest from Yenikeui as far as the Gulf of Edrimid (Adramyti)—near Mytilene—on the east by the line Yenikeui—Balikesri—Semav—Moghla, on the south by the shore facing the island of Castellarizo, and in addition European Turkey and portions of Albania and the Dodokanese islands, also claimed by Italy. Greece likewise puts forward a claim to Constantinople on historical grounds. M. Venizelos asserts that the Greeks form the larger part of the population and that the Turkish nation only approaches it in numbers by reason of a mass of all sorts of officials and the Turkish garrison.

We turn now from the Balkan peninsula to consider the claims of the Czecho-Slovaks. Czecho-Slovakia demands (1) Bohemia, Moravia, Silesia, Slovakia, part of Hungary inhabited by Ruthenes, the Czech Colonies of Glatz and Ratibor in

Prussian Silesia, and Gmund in German Austria. (2) That Czecho-Slovakia should meet Yugo-Slavia along the Lake of Neusiedl, thus giving the Czechs access to the Adriatic, by agreement with the Yugo-Slavs. (3) That the Elbe, Danube and Vistula, as well as the railways Pressburg to Trieste, Pressburg to Fiume and the line running from Prague to Strasburg *via* Nuremburg should be internationalized. (4) That the problem of the Czech population in Vienna which is more than a quarter of the whole, and of the Serbs of Lusatia should be settled in a manner in conformity with the principles of the Entente.

Bohemia, it is admitted even by France, represents a difficult problem. As the *Temps* remarks, taken as a geographical unit, it is not an ethnical unit; nor if taken as an ethnical unit are its geographical limits harmonious. Apart from these aspects there are other considerations involved, as for instance the necessity of providing for access to the sea.

On all of these questions the Powers of Europe are evidently taking sides and it requires an immense amount of optimism to believe that any amount of compromise can ever permanently satisfy all parties.

Japan is attending the Peace Conference as a "rank outsider" to all these questions. She may be entirely indifferent as to *how* they are solved and yet win profit by their solution. Thus the danger of future war is by so much enhanced unless another method is found and that one—the only possible one — a League of Nations with the power given to it to revise present decisions from time to time, in the interest of universal peace. From this we see the reason why those countries, who hope to profit by future strife, are opposed to the League of Nations.

But the greatest menace to the League of Nations as well as to the future peace of the world lies in the striving of the

French Imperialists to sacrifice every other interest to the consummation of their one great object—to disrupt or weaken Germany or Germanism. Accordingly, French support has been given to certain schemes for settling the problems of the former Habsburg monarchy and the Russian border states which are lacking in every essential of common sense and statesmanship or of regard for the interests of the world at large, so necessary in the consideration of the numerous complicated questions that have come before the Peace Conference for determination. For, to settle these questions right, we have to deal with whatever scheme of settlement is proposed in a manner that must stand or fall as a whole. The plan to which French statesmen have been lending their support is to create a new *bloc* of Entente states in Central Europe, namely, Poland, Czecho-Slovakia, Yugo-Slavia, and Rumania, who are to keep alive French antagonism to Germany and erect artificial barriers against Germanism, notwithstanding that Germanism stands today upon a completely different footing from the old Germanism that aroused the antagonism of the world. Each of these States is to be aggrandized at the expense of other races, if the French plan were carried out, and the gaps between them would be filled, for military reasons, by the annexation of unwilling populations. Poland is to include not merely the indisputably Polish population which number about twenty millions, but a further fifteen millions at least of Lithuanians, White Russians, Ruthenians and Germans, while some exponents of the idea would add Courland and the whole Ukraine as well. Danzig, a purely German town comes into this Poland at one end to make a naval port (a port for commercial use can be had without annexation) and at the other end East Galicia (which is by majority Ukrainian) is included, so as to give military connection with a Rumania, also enlarged at the expense of

several other races. Czecho-Slovakia must include not only all the Czecho-Slovaks, but also large bodies of Germans and Magyars within its borders, and, worst of all, the big and nearly solid German population of about three and one half millions round its borders. The strategic part of the plan provides that the new state shall be linked up with Yugo-Slavia to the south by means of a "military corridor" or belt of land lying along the Magyar-Austrian frontier although to create such a corridor means the forcible annexation of purely German territory and the German town of Pressburg on the Danube.

Similarly, the French plan would permit the occupation of a belt of land in purely German territory running from Danzig to Thorn thus cutting off East Prussia from Germany. And in the same way German Austria is to be artificially separated from the German Republic by means of another "corridor." All of these artificial "corridors" are so many artificial barriers erected for the purpose of separating friends and uniting their enemies. The Czechs and Poles have apparently, in this arrangement, learned nothing from experience. When they were compelled to serve in alien armies against their will, they deserted in large numbers to the enemy. And now they propose to create large armies within their borders out of similar recalcitrant elements. Thus we see that even militarily the plan is unsound. And economically it is equally unsound because it would restore the old ascendancy of the landed aristocracy over alien peasants. States built upon such an artificial and unnatural basis have never long survived. Nor would these. For they throw down the gauntlet to the whole German race and dare them to pick it up.

Such is an outline of a far-reaching scheme which French statesmen have been willing to play with. The mere fact that they were willing to give it consideration, exhibits an instance

of the most amazing blindness to realities that the history of statesmanship has yet to record. It matters not that the plan never had any chance of success—the important thing is that such schemes can be deliberately weighed and connived at and it simply indicates that far from the return of an era of good will among the nations there will continue to be enacted behind the scenes many a drama of which the audience in front of the curtain will have no cognizance.

CHAPTER SEVEN.

Straws.

Straws show which way the wind blow. A despatch from the Tokio correspondent of the London *Daily Express* under date of December 28 says:—

“The polite scepticism with which Japan regards the League of Nations proposal is aptly illustrated by Kato, the ex-Foreign Minister, who says that although he knows Viscount Grey and has read all his speeches and pamphlets, he is unable to understand, mankind being what it is, how Western statesmen can imagine that such a league can ever prevent war.

“Viscount Grey, he adds, is a practical man and not a dreamer, and consequently personal discussion might dispel the darkness, though his speeches have failed to do so.

“Meanwhile, discussions of the subject in the Japanese newspapers reveal the fact if and when the project reaches the practical stage, one of the first demands that will be made by Japanese public opinion will be the abolition of the colour bar against Oriental immigration in Canada and the United States.”

Japanese opposition to the idea of a League of Nations is neatly expressed in the foregoing dispatch which contains likewise a clever thrust at the two leading champions of the idea, England and America, whose action in opposing the immigration of Japanese into America, Canada and Australia is apparently in conflict with the ideals and principles put forth in connection with the League of Nations.

Be that as it may, Japanese opposition to the *Volkerenbond* is based upon still more substantial reasons some of which we have already indicated, and we have now to show that there are a good many signs that neither side to the controversy is permitting itself to indulge in any illusions, for Japan is arming and the Anglo-Saxons are arming.

On February 10 appeared the following message from Tokio, in the *Times*. It bears date January 30.

"Members of the Diet have questioned the Government as regards proposed naval and military retrenchment pointing out that American plans are taking a contrary tendency. In this connection the *Jiji* maintains that the Imperial naval policy is to organize two fleets—each of eight battleships and four battle cruisers and also says that a rapid extension of building and armament facilities is now an urgent question."

Simultaneously with the appearance of the above dispatch it is announced that Japan refuses to renounce her claim to Tsingtau and the Shantung peninsula and the railway and other concessions she made herself master of there. This is precisely what the author foretold in the *Problem of Japan*, although he does not for that reason lay claim to any particular amount of political sagacity, as it must surely have been apparent to any student of Japan's politics what her course in this regard would be, in spite of the explicit promises of Count Okuma to the contrary.

The author likewise foretold that Japan was engaging in the Siberian expedition against Russia for the purpose of obtaining for herself a hold on Russia's Maritime Province and the region of the lower Amur river. And now almost at the moment of writing (February 12) comes confirmation in the form of dispatches to the effect that Japan has been granted control of the Siberian Railway to the Ural mountains, preferen-

tial rights in Siberia and N. Manchuria and coal and iron concessions in the Amur region by the Omsk Government in Siberia, in return for the promise of Japanese military assistance to drive out the Bolsheviki and to restore the monarchy in Russia. But Japan from the moment of her entrance on the Siberian expedition made it her business to obtain concessions. Last August she advanced her troops to the Manchu-Siberian frontier and made the border town, Manchuria, her main military headquarters. With the most brutal disregard of China's sovereign rights in this region, and against the protests of the Chinese military commander, Japanese troops forcibly drove the Chinese military from their barracks and established their own military camp in the neighborhood of the town above referred to. They went even further and demanded that the Chinese troops be placed under Japanese command. This was all done under pretext of a movement against the Bolsheviki and German war prisoners who were alleged to be operating in the neighborhood.

What the true object of the expedition was, however, was soon to be made apparent, for soon after the events above recorded, the Japanese troops took up their march in the direction of the important station of Urga in Outer Mongolia, and having corrupted the official in charge there, the Chinese Resident, entered into a secret compact with him agreeing to furnish troops to resist Bolsheviki on the pretext that the Chinese authorities had been appealed to in vain. Japanese Staff Officers now appeared upon the scene and made their arrangements for a military occupation of the principal points as far south as Kiachta. All of these manoeuvres were, of course, the application of the customary Japanese method for exacting some compensation or concessions from the Chinese Government and it likewise showed Japan's purpose to substitute her own influence in Outer Mongolia for that of

Russia whose temporary defection left her without an ally and accomplice in the work of closing in on the frontiers of the Chinese Republic.

On February 12 there likewise appeared a published dispatch to the effect that Japan was threatening China with a declaration of war, the matter of difference having to do with the coming to light through Chinese agency of the secret agreements forced upon China by Japan.

To those who have some understanding of the meaning of political events this step would seem to be but the logical outcome of the various acts that have preceded it and of Japanese policy in the Far East since the beginning of the war. Japan having failed in her plans to disrupt China, having miscarried in her intrigues to secure a Japanese-dictated Government in China with puppet rulers acting under Japanese domination, having misreckoned with respect to Russia and its continued support of Japanese designs, having failed properly to gauge the effect of American intervention in the European War, and finally having lost her fight against the proposed League of Nations—Japan now sees herself confronted with the immediate necessity of acting. She must act and act quickly while the European Powers, and particularly America and England are still laboriously struggling in the whirlpool of European politics. She must strike before these differences are settled, and she hopes to rally to her support all those disaffected European interests who like herself are interested mainly in the opportunism of the moment and care less for the eternal principles of right and justice.

Japan's menace to China throws down the gage of battle to America and England. Will they pick it up? Japan must have her answer now. She cannot afford to wait until these Powers have composed their troubles at home and abroad, Her military and naval preparations are complete. She has

no ally now, and her isolation is so entire at the present time that she must rely upon her own resources. But she has in her favour the fact that England and America have just finished a very tiresome war, that there is little if any enthusiasm left in either country for further fighting, and that the issues in the Far East are not looked upon by the majority of their peoples as vital ones, or ones worth fighting for. Therefore—the boldness of her challenge.

And Japan's readiness for the conflict is unmistakable. Last July she increased the size of her army from 21 divisions counting 4 regiments each, to 42 divisions of 3 regiments each, divided into 21 Army Corps. One hundred million pounds was likewise voted for naval increases with the object of creating three battle squadrons counting three ships of the line each, and one cruiser squadron composed of eight armoured cruisers.

With such an army and navy, with all the approaches to her Island Empire guarded by heavy fortifications strategically placed, with many naval bases on the mainland of Korea from which to launch submarine attack, with the Maritime Province and Vladivostock one of the strongest fortified ports in the world within her immediate grasp, with possession of Port Arthur, Dalny, Tsingtau and other strategic points commanding the entrance to the Gulf of Pechili, with Hawaii and the Philippines overrun with Japanese agents and spies, with China weak and helpless and Russia in dissolution—Japan feels herself in a very strong position. Believing in her own invincibility, she is prepared to defy the world.

And there is something psychic in this defiant Japanese attitude. For the Japanese are no longer the uncritical and all-accepting admirers of all that is Western that they were wont to be. It is true that they still accept, imitate and, if possible, improve upon any new Western concept in the way

of inventions, particularly of the mechanical sort, but that there is a new spirit come over the Japanese nation is manifest in the fact that in their schools and literature they are turning more and more to the ancient Japanese lore in Philosophy and Ethics, and with lessening enthusiasm to scientific European educational methods savoring too much of the practical and the experimental.

But the differences between the Anglo-Saxon and the Nipponese will have to come to a head sooner or later and for the following reasons.

1. China's appeal for justice to the Western Powers cannot for long fall upon deaf ears. And aside from the questions of right and justice these Powers have immense material interests in China. The exhaustion that has come out of the European war, the destruction of industry, the loss of markets, the retrogression of commerce make it necessary that these nations develop new trading marts for their products, and there presents itself no market in the world affording such opportunities and possibilities for development as the Chinese. Hence the policy of the Open Door. But the Open Door in China must not mean the sort of Open Door that Japan has been offering to the nations ever since her occupation of Manchuria. Japanese interpretation of the Open Door has again and again been proven to be a permission to trade on such terms and conditions as the Japanese may see fit to impose. Control of the ports of entry and customs, the fixing of trade regulations and the issue of licenses to trade by Japanese authorities are all based on the assumption of Japan's superior and predominant right. Such an attitude is of course fatal to freedom of trade and commerce, just as Japanese assumption of her right to veto any industrial or engineering project such as the building of a railroad for China is a blight upon all attempts of British and American capital to interest themselves in the Chinese field.

2. Japanese Expansion hits America in the Philippines and Hawaii, and England in India. The Philippines and Hawaii are so Japanese that the visitor sometimes wonders where America comes in, that is, if he pries below the surface. And to America the menace exists always, not only of the troubles that will break out in these islands if war occurs, but likewise, of the fact that they have acted as stepping-stones for the Japanese emigration movement to America. Causes of friction likewise exist with respect to the carrying trade of the islands which is now so largely in the hands of the Japanese, but which the rivalry of the new American mercantile marine will immeasurably sharpen.

Towards India, Japan, ever since she began to assume the toga of leader of the Oriental races, has been a menace. Every movement in Japan is watched with interest in India. The white race's habitual attitude of superiority is resented and the East has found a champion. Indeed Japan's proximity makes the Indian problem a thorny one to handle. There is already a great stew brewing in the Indian pot and England has to reckon with the possibility that a hostile neighbor close at hand, a powerful neighbor too, may make that pot boil over. Accordingly, England must send a powerful fleet to the Pacific to stand sentinel over Japan, but this is likewise fraught with dangers. Just as Germany's growing naval strength was a menace, so likewise is Japan's and with two powerful fleets cruising about the waters of the Pacific, where, in view of the new importance attached to all questions touching the Far East, they may be called upon to maintain a vigilant, firm and even commanding attitude, there is great possibility for friction leading to open rupture, for when Britain again stations a great fleet in the Pacific it will be principally to defend her interests in India and China.

3. Both England and America believe that Japan's emi-

gration policy is directed to political ends. Her emigration colonies in South America and in Mexico are not solely commercial ventures. The emigration projects to these lands seem to follow some thought-out plan. A great steamship company with a capital of £ 4,000,000 is the promoting and guiding spirit of the undertaking, and far from confining itself to the carrying of emigrants, takes a hand in the extensive agricultural and industrial foundations of Japanese settlers in these countries. Coffee, sugar, and caoutchouc plantations have been established which serve as centres of the various Japanese colonies and are not without their political influence.

In other words we may here see a reversal of the maxim "Trade follows the flag," for the Japanese in these regions are disposed to make it read "The flag follows trade." But whether or not political results shall immediately follow, it is certain that Japan is establishing herself economically strong in Brazil, in Argentine and in Mexico, and, primarily, to establish in those countries a sure market for Japanese products, markets from which she can never be barred because her political influence in those countries will, in a large measure, be fixed by settlers. This fact marks the importance of Japan's emigration program.

The Anglo-Saxon world perceives the scope of Japanese plans for establishing an independent world position in spheres of influence hitherto closed to them, and remarks the fact with some anxiety, because all these preparations are but the prelude of the great coming conflict for the supremacy of the Pacific.

CHAPTER EIGHT.

Japanese Circumlocution.

The *Times* of February 13, 1919, publishes a statement made by Baron Makino, former Minister of Foreign Affairs and senior member of the Japanese delegation to the Peace Conference as follows:—

Baron Makino first described how Germany in 1898 took possession of Tsingtau, and Japan acquired under the Treaty of Portsmouth the lease of Port Arthur and Liaotung Peninsula and also the rights of the South Manchurian Railway which runs through Chinese territory as far as Chang Chun. The situation thus created, said Baron Makino, was delicate and at times difficult, and quite naturally the penetration by a Japanese railway of Chinese territory added fresh fuel among the Chinese to the fuels of antagonism. China became, year after year, more and more a centre of international competition and also a centre of international intrigue.

Baron Makino then described the taking of Tsingtau, an operation which cost Japan many millions of money and 2000 lives. From that time peace was maintained in the Far East, and for four years the commerce of the Pacific was maintained undisturbed. India, America, China, Japan, the Philippine Islands, Hong Kong could carry on their trade without molestation.

“Throughout the years of German occupation,” added Baron Makino, “the harbour grew from an inconsequential refuge for junks in stormy weather to a great naval base. *In the building of the harbour, Germany made a capital investment and this great asset Japan is willing to return to China in accordance with an agreement between the two Governments*

*which affords Japan reasonable opportunity to share in fair co-operation with China and other nations, in the privileges which China had previously granted to Germany.** Under this agreement China comes into possession of a fine harbour built at a cost of many millions spent by the German Government, and the whole territory of Kiaochau 80 years sooner than would otherwise have been possible."

Immediately Japan took possession of the conquered territory the old antagonisms broke out afresh, fanned by the Germans in China, and in 1915 Japan sought to bring about a *rapprochement*. "Out of the negotiations came a treaty or agreement entered into between China and Japan under which Japan agreed to restore Kiaochau to China. This convention is an open document and has been published in full. Attached to that agreement are no secret or concealed clauses whatsoever. These engagements were entered into by China and subsequently, in 1918, *an arrangement was entered into regarding international settlements in Tsingtau and some other concessions by China giving Japan opportunity for co-operation with China in the development of Shantung in consideration for the return of Tsingtau and Kiaochau.** I desire, however, to state positively that this agreement is in no sense oppressive, nor does it provide for illegitimate or arbitrary control by Japan of any Chinese territory or China's territorial rights."

"The details of this agreement have not been published owing to an understanding between the two countries and because the agreement is preliminary to business matters which are as yet in an incomplete stage. *Japan has repeatedly announced that she has no territorial ambitions in China,** but desires to live in amity with her neighbor. The acquisition of territory belonging to one nation, which it is the intention of the country acquiring to exploit to its sole advantage, is not conducive to amity or good will. It would therefore be folly on the one hand to say that Japan seeks to live in amity and good neighborhood when, on the other hand, she takes that from which she secures the sole advantage to the exclusion of the original owner.

"In desiring to secure from China right to concessions in the province of Shantung Japan does not seek more than a fair division in co-operation

* The italics are ours.

with China. Surely it is not taking advantage of China to ask that we be permitted, on the same basis as other nations, to have equal opportunity* for development purposes. China has the raw material: we have need for raw material, and we have the capital to invest with China in its development for use by ourselves as well as China. I somewhat labour this point because we are accused of aims in an exactly opposite direction to those of fair co-operation and partnership,* as well as being accused of the folly of making deliberate and obvious effort to take advantage of our neighbor. Let me emphasize that neither in Shantung nor in Manchuria does Japan seek to take improper advantage of China. She seeks equal opportunity, an open door, and the right of peaceful co-operation between the two nations of the Far East.”**

To those who are not familiar with Japanese methods of diplomacy, the foregoing statement may sound like a very fair and honest exposition of facts. To others, however, who have followed the application of these methods in the past, the statement is precisely of the sort that is to be expected from a Japanese diplomat who is merely following the usual plan of concealing Japan's real designs behind meaningless phrases. The crux of the matter contained in the foregoing statement is to be found in those portions italicized. Several of the assertions made by Baron Makino will have to be challenged and it is the purpose of the author to expose the real significance that lies behind these fine words.

Firstly, the author wishes to call attention to the frequent use of the word “*co-operation*” in the statement of the Japanese Peace representative. It occurs five times in a statement that occupies about one-third of a column in the *Times* newspaper. This is no mere coincidence. Behind that word “*co-operation*” there is hidden all the devilish ingenuity which seeks, by similar methods, to make of China a second Korea.

* The italics are ours.

On pages 12—13 of *The Problem of Japan* the author wrote:—"The Japanese are well aware that one of the chief proofs of industrial expansion and commerce is supplied by maintaining friendly relations with peoples with whom intercourse is exchanged. They have this to bear in mind in their intercourse with China. In the face of Chinese enmity, trade and commerce would languish and perhaps die out entirely. Peaceful penetration, absorption and territorial expansion being, as before stated, principles which are slightly out of credit, *a new principle was necessary to be discovered* as an index to future relations with the Chinese.

"An inventive race like the Japanese were not long in discovering the new principle. *They call it "friendly co-operation."* The concessions which Japan asked of China in February 1915 were designed to fit in with the new principle." And on page 14, the following:—"In thus substituting the principle of "*friendly co-operation*" (of which the results obtained under the "*Five Groups*" demands are an illustration) for the old, discredited principles known as peaceful penetration, absorption and territorial expansion, Japan believes she has discovered a new means for attaining the old ends. It is true that Japan has bound herself over and over again to help in the preservation of China's territorial integrity and of her national independence, and in the principles of the open door, and equal opportunity. But all treaties may be construed with freedom in keeping with the opinion and interests of the negotiators. Furthermore, as many influential Japanese argue, the open door is attained so long as any trade at all is permitted, and the principle in no way inhibits very special privileges to their own manufacturers which render competition with them impossible. They argue further, that neither the territorial integrity nor the national independence of China is violated by long leasehold concessions or by the definition of certain regions as the closed preserves of specific nations."

And now we arrive at the true inwardness of the matter. Behind Baron Makino's bald statements, there is concealed a world of inference. When he speaks of "co-operation," what

does he mean by that term? When he states that, in exchange for the return of Tsingtau and Kiaochau, China granted to Japan certain concessions, what are we to understand was included in those "concessions?" And why, if they are so innocent in character as the Baron wishes us to believe, are they included in a secret agreement? And if this secret agreement is of so little importance why was China threatened with war in February 1919 in case she made the agreement public? When Japanese statesmen use the words "equal opportunity," "open door," and "peaceful co-operation," what is the practical sense of these expressions in their application? If we have any doubts upon the subject, after witnessing Japan's totally selfish and arrogant display of her power in Manchuria and Mongolia, and after considering what Japan attempted to effect with her "*Five Groups*" demands on China in January 1915, we shall probably be helped to a clearer understanding of the truth, if we make an excursion into Korean politics and see for ourselves how application of precisely the same insidious methods hiding behind the same smooth and meaningless phrases ended in the utter extinction of the Korean Empire and its absorption by Japan.

Korea is a land with an ancient culture of its own. Its people are a nation of dreamers and thinkers whose principal cult is the artistic and the literary. But they are intensely patriotic. Japan herself owes a great deal of her culture to Korea from whom she borrowed freely in past ages. The Empire of Korea had been a bone of contention between Japan and China already in the sixteenth century and its importance was at that early day fully recognized by Japanese statesmen like Nobunaga and Hideyoshi. When the exclusion period which lasted from 1603 to the middle of the last century was succeeded by the "Restoration era," Korea once more became the subject matter of Japanese politics and the great war between

China and Japan in 1894-5 was occasioned by the Japanese determination to exclude China from her suzerainty over Korea and to substitute in its stead a Japanese influence; but in the Treaty of Shimonoseki that closed the war, the Japanese Government expressly engaged *to respect the independence of Korea*. *

In 1896 Japan concluded a treaty with Russia, amended by the protocol of April 25, 1898, defining their attitude towards Korea, as follows:—"The Imperial Governments of Japan and Russia definitively *recognize the sovereignty and entire independence of Korea*,* and mutually engage to refrain from all direct interference in the internal affairs of the country."

Also with Great Britain, Japan declared her attitude towards Korea in the Anglo-Japanese Agreement for Alliance concluded January, 1902, as follows:—"The High Contracting Parties *having mutually recognized the independence of China and Korea*,* declare themselves to be entirely uninfluenced by any aggressive tendencies in either country."

On February 10, 1904, the Mikado issued a rescript declaring war on Russia. It concisely enunciated Japanese policy with respect to the war and specifically as regards Korea as follows:—"The *integrity of Korea is a matter of gravest concern to this Empire*,* not only because of our traditional relations with that country, but because the separate existence of Korea is essential to the safety of our realm."

According to this rescript Japan made war in order to preserve the integrity of Korea, to release Manchuria from the illegal occupation of Russia, and maintain the integrity of China. And immediately upon the rupture of diplomatic relations with Russia, Japan, on February 23, 1904, concluded a new treaty of six articles with Korea itself, as follows.

"Article I.—For the purpose of maintaining a permanent

* The italics are ours.

and solid friendship between Japan and Korea, and firmly establishing peace in the Far East, the Imperial Government of Korea shall place full confidence in the Imperial Government of Japan, and adopt the advice of the latter in regard to improvement in administration.

"Article II.—The Imperial Government of Japan shall in a spirit of firm friendship ensure the safety and repose of the Imperial House of Korea.

"Article III.—The Imperial Government of Japan definitely *guarantees the independence and territorial integrity of the Korean Empire.* *

"Article IV.—In case the welfare of the Imperial House of Korea or the territorial integrity of Korea is endangered by aggression of a third power or by internal disturbances, the Imperial Government of Japan shall immediately take such necessary measures as the circumstances require, and in such cases the Imperial Government of Korea shall give full facilities to promote action of the Imperial Japanese Government.

"The Imperial Government of Japan may, for the attainment of the above mentioned object, occupy, when the circumstances require it, such places as may be necessary from strategical points of view

"Article V.—The Governments of the two countries shall not in future, without mutual consent, conclude with a third Power such an arrangement as may be contrary to the principles of the present protocol.

"Article VI.—Details in connection with the present protocol shall be arranged, as the circumstances may require, between the representatives of Japan and the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs in Korea."

Thus we perceive from the foregoing citations that within a period of less than ten years, Japan had, on five separate

* The italics are ours.

occasions between the outbreaks of her two wars with China and Russia, respectively, solemnly engaged to respect the independence and territorial integrity of Korea. Then followed the Japanese victory in her war with Russia, and the Japanese Korean policy immediately begins to assume an entirely different complexion. Witness the following from the Treaty of Portsmouth concluded between Japan and Russia, August 29, 1905:—

“Article II.—The Russian Government, acknowledges that *Japan possesses in Korea paramount political, military, and economic interests*,* engages neither to obstruct nor to interfere with the measures of guidance, protection, and control which the Government of Japan may find it necessary to take in Korea. It is understood that Russian subjects in Korea shall be treated exactly in the same manner as the subjects or citizens of other foreign Powers—that is to say, they shall be placed on the same footing as the subjects or citizens of the most favoured nation. It is also agreed that, in order to avoid all causes of misunderstanding, the two High Contracting Parties will abstain on the Russo-Korean frontier from taking any military measures which may menace the security of Russian or Korean territory.”

Here we perceive the first break in Japan's attitude towards Korea showing the hollowness of all her pretences. There is no longer any talk of Korea's independence and territorial integrity, but of Japan's “paramount political, military, and economic interests” in Korea. A sequel to the Russian treaty clauses about Korea, is contained in the new Anglo-Japanese Agreement of 1905 as follows:—“Article III,—*Japan possessing paramount political, military, and economic interests in Korea*,* Great Britain recognizes the right of Japan to take such measures of guidance, control, and protection in Korea

* The italics are ours.

as she may deem proper and necessary to safeguard and advance those interests, provided always that such measures are not contrary to the principles of equal opportunities for the commerce and industry of all nations."

Thus is revealed in the Treaty Article just cited the price Great Britain had to pay for the Japanese Alliance, namely, the granting to Japan of a free hand in Korea. How Japan took advantage of the situation now remains to be told, and finally how she even came to absolutely disregard her stipulation with England to grant equal opportunities for the commerce and industry of all nations in Korea.

From the time of the removal of Chinese influences from Korea down to the close of the Russo-Japanese war, there had been a struggle going on between Japanese and Russian diplomatists to gain ascendancy on behalf of their respective countries in the peninsula Kingdom. A number of stirring events agitated the Korean capital during this period of intrigue such as the assassination of the Queen of Korea by the Japanese on October 8, 1895; the subsequent flight of the intimidated Emperor to the Russian Legation at Seoul, where he sought sanctuary for a year; and the conclusion of agreements in 1896 at Seoul and at St. Petersburg, already referred to, placing on record the recognition of the independence of Korea by Russia and Japan, and limiting the number of troops to be maintained in the capital by each Power to 1000 men. But we need not dwell on these minor acts of the tragedy that was being enacted in Korea, as they only led up to the *dénouement* which occurred on November 17, 1905. On that day, Marquis Ito, the Japanese Resident General in Korea accompanied by a force of Japanese soldiers compelled members of the Korean Government to sign a Treaty at the point of the bayonet, depriving Korea of her independence. Various authentic accounts have been given of what took

place, notably the narrative as authorized by the Prime Minister in the native papers, and which was promptly suppressed by order of the Japanese, the translation of that report published in English by the *Korea Daily News*, and the statement of Mr. Homer B. Hulbert, in his authoritative work, "The Passing of Korea." All of these agree in their exposition of the facts. The account of the Court Chamberlain is as follows:—

On November 11, 1905, Marquis Ito was received in audience by the Emperor of Korea at Seoul. The Marquis presented an autographed letter from the Mikado, which read as follows:—

"I, the Emperor of Japan, hereby congratulate your Majesty on the restoration of peace in the Far East, and, in order that the friendly relations existing between our two nations should become still closer, I hereby send my special ambassador, whom I beg you to receive.

"I also wish to assure your Majesty, that I shall hereafter guard the integrity of Korea, and vouchsafe the personal safety of the Imperial Household."

At three o'clock on the afternoon of November 15, Marquis Ito, accompanied by Secretary Kukubo, of the Japanese Legation, and Mr. Pak Yong Wha, of the Korean Imperial Household, was again received in audience by his Majesty. At this audience the Japanese envoy presented his proposals in the following three articles:—

"Article I.—The Korean Department of Foreign Affairs shall be abolished. In future all diplomatic dealings on the part of Korea shall be dispatched by a special council sitting at Tokio.

"Article II.—The Japanese Minister at Seoul shall hereafter be called 'General Superintendent' or 'Director of Affairs'.

Article III.—The Japanese Consular representative at Seoul and at different ports of Korea shall hereafter be called 'Superintendents'."

The Japanese envoy then proceeded to urge upon his Majesty the necessity of promptly giving his assent to the signing of the articles.

The Emperor, in reply, said, "I had heard, of late, rumours and had seen statements in the newspapers to the effect that Japan intended to propose a treaty for my acceptance placing Korea under her protectorate. Never doubting that his Majesty, the Mikado, was sincere in the assurances which he gave to the world in his declaration of war against Russia, and which were embodied in the treaty signed in Seoul last year between your Empire and my land to preserve the "independence and territorial integrity of Korea," I gave no credit to such unauthorized reports. I congratulated myself upon having the privilege to welcome you as his Majesty's representative, never doubting that your mission was a friendly and honourable one. Instead of that expectation your present demands exceed my wildest apprehensions."

Marquis Ito said, "These demands are not of my framing, but are the mandates from my Imperial master. They are designed for the good of both nations, and to ensure the establishment of permanent peace in the Far East. I therefore beg that your Majesty will speedily accede to them."

The Emperor, replying, said, "From time immemorial it has been the custom of the rulers of Korea, when confronted with questions so momentous as this, to consult first with their Ministers and the officials of the Government; and having obtained their advice, to submit it to the wisdom of the scholars and to the sentiment of the common people of the realm. I, alone, cannot decide a question so vital to the people of my land."

Marquis Ito, in some heat, returned, "The opinions of the people can at all times be influenced by force of arms. The friendship of the nations is at stake, and I submit it is the duty

of your Majesty to make haste in agreeing to these proposals."

His Majesty said, "My consent would mean the annihilation of my country. I shall never agree to those articles even if my refusal cost me my life."

The following day, November 16, the Japanese envoy invited the Prime Minister and the members of the cabinet to his hotel to renew his appeal. Many hours were spent in fruitless discussion, and at dead of night the officials retired to their respective homes firm in their determination to oppose the Japanese demands.

The same day, Pak Che Soon, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, had been called to the Japanese Legation and there subjected to all the powers of persuasion possessed by Minister Hayashi. He stood firm, however, and the 16th closed with the negotiations at a deadlock.

On November 17, Mr. Hayashi again received the Ministers at his Legation, this time at two o'clock in the afternoon. After some hours of bootless talk, he suggested an adjournment to the palace and a renewal of the discussion in the presence of the Emperor. This proposal was agreed to by the Koreans, and the session was resumed in the place which Yi Hyong (the Emperor) had caused to be built, for safety's sake, in the shadow of the British and American Legations. He was about to test the value of their protection.

When the council had been opened before his Majesty, the Prime Minister, Han Kiu Sul, detailed the course of events, and explained the impossibility of agreement between the Japanese envoys and themselves. He earnestly importuned the Emperor not to yield, even though his life and the lives of his Ministers should be the price of the refusal.

"At this point," says the Court Chamberlain, "his Majesty, the Prime Minister, and Pak Che Soon, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, wept."

"Of a sudden a great force of Japanese police, gendarmes, and soldiers swarmed into the Palace, surrounded the Imperial library, in which his Majesty was then occupying apartments, and with drawn swords and fixed bayonets defied the Council of Ministers. His Majesty retired. Marquis Ito, accompanied by General Hasegawa, who is charged with the massacre of Chinese at Port Arthur in 1894, entered the Council Chamber. Learning that the representations of Mr. Hayashi had not availed, the Marquis gripped the Prime Minister by the wrist and exhorted him to reopen the conference. Han Kiu Sul refused. Marquis Ito stormed. The Korean was determined.

Marquis Ito then demanded an audience of his Majesty and was refused, his Majesty referring him to his Ministers. Marquis Ito then called one of the clerks of the State Council and ordered him to rewrite the summons for the council, and at once declared the meeting open.

The Prime Minister definitely refused to sign the articles. The other Ministers concurred, the Minister for Foreign Affairs qualifying his refusal by proposing certain amendments. Those were promptly made by Marquis Ito; but before the second ballot, the Prime Minister and the Ministers for Justice and Finance intimated their determination not to vote. The Prime Minister left the assembly to seek counsel of the Emperor. He was pursued by Mr. Hagiwara, secretary of the Japanese Legation, accompanied by a force of Japanese military, who forcibly conducted him to a room of the Imperial library and held him prisoner there.

To him now came Marquis Ito and General Hasegawa with threats and intimidation. The Prime Minister remained inflexible. Marquis Ito, beside himself with rage, demanded, "should his Majesty your Emperor command you, would you still refuse?"

The reply made with the utmost firmness was—

"Even so. To this affair I cannot give my consent, even if his Majesty so decrees it."

During the night of November 17 further intimidations were attempted but without avail, both Emperor and Minister remaining firm.

Marquis Ito next despatched emissaries to the Foreign Office with orders to bring back the Foreign Office seal. Turning to the Council of Ministers, he said:—

"It makes no difference whether the Prime Minister's seal be attached to the articles or not. It is the seal of the Minister for Foreign Affairs that counts."

He relied upon the decree of August 3, 1885, which affirmed that all contracts between the Korean Government and foreigners must bear the seal of the Foreign Office.

The Prime Minister being still under guard, the seal was affixed to the document, and under stress of coercion the Ministers for Home Affairs, War, Education and Agriculture appended their seals.

At two o'clock on the morning of November 18, Marquis Ito, General Hasegawa and Mr. Hayashi left the palace and the Japanese guards were withdrawn. The session had lasted exactly twelve hours.

The so-called Treaty consisted of five articles:—

"The Governments of Japan and Korea, desiring to strengthen the principle of solidarity which unites the two Empires, have with that object in view agreed upon and concluded the following stipulations, to serve until the moment arrives when it is recognized that Korea has attained national strength:—

"Article I.—The Government of Japan, through the Department of Foreign Affairs at Tokio, will hereafter have the control and direction of the external relations and affairs of Korea; and the diplomatic and consular representatives of

Japan will have the charge of the subjects and of the interests of Korea in foreign countries.

"Article II.—The Government of Japan undertake to see to the execution of the treaties actually existing between Korea and other Powers, and the Government of Korea engages not to conclude hereafter any act or engagement having an international character except through the medium of the Government of Japan.

"Article III.—The Government of Japan shall be represented at the Court of his Majesty the Emperor of Korea by a Resident General, who shall reside at Seoul, primarily for the purpose of taking charge of and directing matters relating to diplomatic affairs. He shall have the right of private and personal audience of his Majesty the Emperor of Korea. The Japanese Government shall also have the right to station Residents at the several open ports, and at such other places as it may deem necessary. Such Residents shall, under the direction of the Resident-General, exercise the powers and functions hitherto appertaining to Japanese Consuls in Korea, and shall perform such duties as may be necessary in order to carry into full effect the provisions of this agreement.

"Article IV.—The stipulations of all treaties and agreements existing between Japan and Korea not inconsistent with the provisions of this agreement shall continue in force.

"Article V.—The Government of Japan undertakes to maintain the welfare and dignity of the Imperial House of Korea."

This document passed into law although obtained in the manner indicated by the coercion of five out of eight Ministers, one of whom the Minister for Foreign Affairs protested against the use made of his seal, and in spite of the firm stand taken by both Emperor and Prime Minister, who persisted in their refusal to sign away their country's independence to the very

last, preferring, if necessary, to suffer death rather than dishonour.

When the news of the conclusion of the treaty became general, consternation spread throughout the country. Former Ministers hastened to the capital and held a meeting at which they decided to memorialize the Throne to repudiate the treaty and to sentence to death the officials who had executed it. The Emperor being practically a prisoner in his palace, surrounded by Japanese guards made this significant reply. "I have received so many memorials from officials and from the people, high and low, every day of late, that I fully appreciate the public resentment, but you yourselves must find a means to rearrange the matter, and I order you to return to your homes."

The memorialists, according to custom, remained in the palace until such time as their petition could be granted. They knelt in the cold, icy streets, day and night mutely appealing.

Japanese protests to these proceedings availing nothing, steps were taken with characteristic Japanese brutality for forcibly removing the petitioners.

The leaders of the petitioners, Prince and General Min Yong Whang sent the following statement to all the foreign Legations.

"It has been acknowledged by the world that Korea is an independent nation, and Japan has solemnly announced on many occasions, beginning with the Treaty of Shimonoseki and including the Declaration of War between Japan and Russia, and ending with the treaty between Japan and Korea in February of last year, that she also would respect and preserve the independence and integrity of our Empire.

"A few days ago the Japanese Envoy and the Japanese Minister entered the Palace and compelled the Minister for Foreign Affairs to place his seal upon a document which provides for the establishment of a Japanese supreme administrator in Korea, and for the transfer of Korean diplomatic

affairs to Japan. This document being utterly opposed to what Japan had led us to expect, has not been agreed to by our Emperor, and is firmly opposed by the Prime Minister of our Cabinet.

"The Japanese Envoy used threats and violence to obtain the consent of the Ministers; the palace was besieged with soldiers, and the official seal was stolen from the Foreign Office. The Japanese call a document concluded under such circumstances a treaty!

"Foreign Ministers who reside in Seoul are being driven away, and Korea will be deprived of all hope of appeal. We, therefore, hope that the foreign Ministers will take joint action and refuse to recognize a treaty made under such conditions."

The petitioners maintained their posts for three days and nights without sleep or refreshment, in spite of threats and intimidation, and under the bayonets of the Japanese guards. At the end of that time, the leader of the Petitioners finding that all protests and memorials were fruitless and unavailing, left his post and proceeded to the house of an old and trusted servant of his family. There, on the morning of November 30 he cut his throat and died protesting at the outrage to the honour of his country.

As the suicides continued, and the people kneeling on their mats in petition before the gates of the palace, would not get up, the Japanese alarmed at the awkward publicity given to their method of securing a treaty of friendship, made some lame attempts to justify their action of which the following extract from the official Japanese statement issued, is a fair sample and reminds us only too forcibly of the same methods of circumlocution employed by Baron Makino in his statement in the *Times* above quoted. The extract reads:—

"Several days' conference between Marquis Ito and Mr. Hayashi, on the one hand, and the Korean Ministers on the

other, convinced the latter that in consideration of the peace of the Far East and the situation occupied by Korea, the conclusion of the new Convention was inevitable. Nevertheless, it is true that when, on November 17, the Ministers assembled in the Palace, the Prime Minister, Mr. Han Kiu Sul, declared himself radically opposed to the Convention, and with the exception of one or two of his colleagues, *all refrained from addressing to the Throne any declaration of conviction that the Convention should be concluded.*" *

This last clause which we have italicized is certainly a masterpiece, if we are seeking for a fine example of diplomatic usage to convey a wrong impression. Here the impression sought to be conveyed is that of a calm, deliberative gathering of Ministers, such a one as might assemble to debate the subject of the color of a new postage-stamp, soon to be ordered printed by the Department of Posts. And yet the truth is, as described by eye-witnesses that the scene was one of indescribable excitement with armed guards everywhere, swords flashing, pistols drawn ready-cocked, and Ministers trembling with anger and passion, vehemently declaring themselves ready to die rather than to sign the proposed articles, and this scene is translated by Japanese diplomacy into "all refrained from addressing to the Throne any declaration of conviction that the Convention should be concluded." And in the light of that form of language, and not otherwise, one must read Baron Makino's calm and dispassionate statement in the *Times*, that "subsequently, in 1918, an arrangement was entered into regarding international settlements in Tsingtau and some other concessions by China giving Japan opportunity for co-operation with China in the development of Shantung."

We now come to the consideration of another part of our

* The italics are ours.

inquiry, namely, the question of the value that is to be assigned to Baron Makino's assurance, in the *Times* statement, promising to observe the principles of the Open Door and equal opportunities for all nations.

In what we shall have to say on the subject, we make no pretence of disclosing any new information, not already to the fullest extent in the possession of every great Power in the world, with reference to Japan's failure to carry out the terms of her oft-repeated promise, made in solemn contractual form, not only with China, but with Great Britain, Russia, America, Germany and France, to observe the principles referred to. Our purpose is merely to describe in a general way, and for the general reader, who has not had time or opportunity to make himself familiar with the subject, the manner in which Japan has managed to secure for herself a position of preponderating power and influence, altogether opposed to the spirit of the doctrines of the Open Door and equal opportunity. It may be urged that she has not acquired any privileges without first consulting China. But it must be remembered that when Japan succeeded to Russia's rights and privileges in South Manchuria, China's consent to the recognition of those rights was not freely and voluntarily given, but was purely a case of submission to *force majeure*. And just as Japan acquired her rights and privileges in Korea at the point of the bayonet, as has been related above, so she forced concession after concession down the throats of Chinese Statesmen until there remained little, if anything, left of Chinese claim to the rights of sovereignty in any of the regions over which Japan assumes to exercise special rights. Nor can there be any doubt that the assertion of the principle of equal opportunity as set forth in the series of Conventions between Japan and the Powers must outweigh any clause in an agreement between China and Japan in violation of such principle.

It is perhaps necessary to emphasize that in so far as the competition of Japan is conducted on fair lines, her activities, though they may give rise to some regrets, cannot be made the subject of envious complaint. But it is the duty of statesmen in power to see that Japan obtains no other political advantages save those to which she is rightfully entitled and which have been defined in her treaties with the Powers directly interested. Through the failure of British statesmen to insist on clauses of the Anglo-Japanese treaty of 1905 being carried out in accordance with their terms, Japan was enabled to consolidate her hold on Korea so as practically to exclude all foreign competition. Notwithstanding the provisions in that treaty guaranteeing "equal opportunities for the commerce and industry of all nations in Korea," it was soon discovered that in practice the stipulation was entirely disregarded, for when American and European engineers wished to enter the country for prospecting purposes, every possible hindrance and restrictive regulation were placed in their way; their routes, destinations and objects of research having all to be notified in advance, whereas Japanese were freely admitted and no questions asked. But this was only the beginning of the foreign prospector's troubles. When it came to the laying down of the conditions under which alone he would be allowed to mine, it was soon discovered that the obstacles raised in his path were practically insuperable. Permissions to mine could be refused by the Japanese Minister of Agriculture or by the Resident General "in the public interest or for any other reason;" negotiations between operating miners and intending investors were subject to supervision by the same authorities, and the right of transfer of a mining concession was similarly controlled; concessions might be revoked that had been "granted by mistake," and, worst of all, if such revocation takes place, the authorities have the right to con-

fiscate all works and structures above and below ground of the concession "granted by mistake," and there is no appeal from the decision of the bureaucrat who decides that a concession has been "granted by mistake," nor redress in any higher forum for any damage or loss caused by the action of the officials mentioned; and finally the Resident General has such complete control, under the Mining Regulations, of negotiations with foreigners, as makes it possible for him to practically shut out competition in favor of his own countrymen, to refuse permits to all companies that do not submit to Japanese direction and procure their machinery, material and supplies in Japan. With such regulations as these in force in Korea, it cannot be wondered at if foreign capital feels itself intentionally excluded.

What has hereinabove been stated with respect to Japanese measures towards foreigners seeking to secure commercial interests in Korea has reference to the period of the Japanese protectorate from 1905 down to the time of its complete annexation in 1910. The object of the recital has been to show how the Japanese interpreted their promise to guarantee "equal opportunities for the commerce and industry of all nations."

After the annexation in 1910, the Japanese threw off the mask entirely, and in response to representations by the British Foreign Minister, refused to bind themselves further than to the assurance that British subjects owning land or mines in Korea should not be interfered with, but they added significantly that as regards the capacity of foreigners to acquire landed property and mining rights in Korea, they were unable to bind themselves for all time but were well disposed to maintain, "at least for the present," existing laws. This declaration, in effect, as is fully recognized in England, was tantamount to the abrogation of all British treaty rights in Korea.

So much for the Japanese policy of equal opportunity in Korea. And now let us examine the case in Manchuria.

When the United States and Great Britain gave their moral and financial support to Japan in her war with Russia, it was because they detested the exclusive character of Russia's methods in the Far East, her policy of aggression and attack on the integrity of China, and detected in them a cynical disregard for the policy of the Open Door. But the United States was not long in realizing that Russia, after the war, to some extent perpetuated these methods in North Manchuria, whereas Japan not only imitated but actually elaborated them in the South. Indeed the complaints that reached Washington relating to preferential treatment in matters of trade and commerce, largely concerned that region under the domination of the Japanese. When, moreover, it became apparent that the former enemies of 1904-1905 had suddenly laid aside their differences and were hobnobbing together, with a newly discovered friendship, it was found that the reason therefor lay in the pursuit by the new friends and allies of identical ends, namely opposition to and disregard of the Open Door.

The nations had decreed the policy of the Open Door for Manchuria. It was intended that merchants and traders of whatever nationality should have the right to transact business and to reside in the region, if desired, as freely as the most favoured nation. What actually happened was that Japan and Russia having control of the Manchurian Railways turned them into political machines. Japanese administration is exclusive along the line of the railways she controls in Manchuria, and by the purchase of land she is able to spread her influence far and wide on either side. Foreign merchants who seek to do business in Manchuria must necessarily reside in the neighborhood of the railway, thus coming directly under exclusive Japanese jurisdiction, and their freedom of action is

accordingly restricted by Japanese law and Japanese regulation. The danger of the situation is that, by the lapse of time, what is at present merely a pretence, will hereafter be claimed as an established right. Recognizing this fact, it has been the opinion of American statesmen that it is the duty of the Powers to insist, at this stage, that the situation be clearly defined. And it was for this reason that the American Secretary of State, Knox, made a proposal in 1910 for the neutralizing of the railways in Manchuria. But Mr. Knox also foresaw that the identity of interests of Russia and Japan in Manchuria would not persist for any great length of time, because each country is equally determined to shut the other entirely out from Manchuria. Japan covets the Russian spheres of influence to the north, and Russia finds it imperative to crowd back the Japanese and re-establish herself on ice-free harbours in the South.

Mr. Knox's proposal, foreseeing the coming conflict, tried to forestall it, and accordingly we perceive the two aims of American policy in this region to be, firstly, to avert another great conflict that will give the victor domination over Manchuria and a preponderating influence over China, and, secondly, to retain for the benefit of the nations, the principle of the Open Door in Manchuria. It has been the British policy of surrender in this region—England tied by her treaty with Japan—that has made possible the political and commercial domination of Japan and Russia, in violation of all treaty engagements having for their object the preservation of China's integrity and the strict maintenance of the principle of equal opportunity. British and American policy require the commercial neutralization of Manchuria and therefore it is no longer possible for these countries to follow the course in this region, set by Japan in her own exclusive interests. And here again the future interests of the German Republic are identical with those of America and Britain.

CHAPTER NINE.

Underlying Causes of Japan's Isolation.

In the closing days of the reign of the Tokugawa Shoguns there appeared a great teacher and writer, a member of the Choshu clan, by the name of Yoshida Shoin. Among his friends and pupils were numbered Kido, Ito and Inouye, all of whom played such prominent roles in the making of the new Japan, and whose names fill the pages of her subsequent history. What Yoshida's influence was on the future career of these men will be referred to later on.

Kido was one of the real promoters of the 'Restoration' and together with Ito and Inouye made possible the monarch's cause which led to the sacrifice of the old order to the new and with Ito and Inouye, Kido was charged with the re-organization of the Central Government in 1871. Kido's place in Japanese history is, however, most firmly fixed by the prominent part he played in uniting the western clans to promote the Imperial cause.

Inouye down to the time of his death in 1916 was regarded as the greatest financial expert in Japan, and together with Ito, Matsukata and Yamagata exercised the greatest influence on the political life of Japan, of any men of his generation. Indeed, it may be said that Inouye was one of four Elder Statesmen who have been the most important political factors in Japan ever since Okubo's assassination in 1878. Ito passed from the scene in 1909, but the others were still at the helm

and directed the destinies of Japan at the outbreak of the world war in 1914.

Ito, reorganizer of the Central Government in 1871, author of Japan's Constitution, champion of the clan system, Resident-General of Korea, a constructive statesman and diplomatist of the first rank, was the Bismarck of Japan.

Kido, Inouye, Ito, these three men, the makers of modern Japan were, as has been stated, the pupils and disciples of the great patriot Yoshida Shoin. Yoshida was one the products of the so-called "patriotic schools" which sprang up in every village and town throughout western Japan during the second quarter of the last century. The establishment of these schools was one of the outcomes of the movement that had been going on since about the early part of the eighteenth century to "restore and exalt the old Japanese customs, language and religion in a spirit of ardent and indiscriminating patriotism." Some of the greatest teachers in the movement like Motoori and Mutsukuni, laboured diligently for the exaltation of Shinto and the ancient literature and history of Japan. But there was a political object behind these efforts, which consisted in advocating the claims of the Emperor as against the Shoguns, particularly by giving prominence to the mythical history and divine origin of the Emperors. And the work of these scholars was carried forward in the nineteenth century by Kirata, Yoritomo, and Yoshida Shoin. The "patriotic schools," already referred to, taught the exaltation of the Emperor as the descendant of the Sun-Goddess, and therefore the rightful ruler of Japan, the destruction of the power of the usurping Tokugawa Shoguns and *the expansion in Asia of the Japanese Empire by force of arms*. To ensure success for the contemplated changes, instruction was given in military science, and actual training went on in the old and in the new or Western style.

Yoshida's program included the *acquisition of the Kurile*

Islands, Saghalien, Kamchatka, Formosa, Korea, Manchuria, and large parts of Eastern Siberia—in fact the expansion of the Japanese Empire into a great continental Asiatic Power.

Whereas in Russia, the oligarchy and the bureaucracy who ruled in the councils of the Empire, found it necessary to pursue a strong foreign policy embodying Pan-Slavism and other imperialistic features leading directly to the brink of war, as a measure for distracting the people from the corruption, weakness, obscurant and reactionary tendencies of the Government in home politics and for holding in check the revolutionary and liberal elements who were clamouring for a greater amount of representative government, just so in Japan the Genro or Elder statesmen, the real rulers of Japan, deliberately embarked upon a similar policy of Imperialism and aggression because of the political situation that had evolved in Japan due to the failure of Constitutional government as applied under Japan's new fundamental law promulgated in 1889. For after five years of trial, it was found that Japan had reached a point from which further progress could only be made by some radical changes in her political institutions.

What we propose now to establish, is the fact that, due to her form of government, the absence of effective representative rule, and the administration of affairs by a powerful oligarchy supported by an elaborately developed bureaucratic system, Japan remains the only great nation in the world that is able to resist the onrush of democratic ideas and, with the forces of militarism and imperialism so strongly entrenched and so completely dependent for their future maintenance upon a program of foreign aggression embracing the full realization of Yoshida Shoin's ideas, it is the only nation left against which the rest of the world is ever likely to unite in battle in order to complete the work of making the world "Safe for democracy."

The "Restoration" epoch began in 1867. That is to say in that year the Emperor was once more restored to his ancient rights and privileges of absolutism whereas for centuries the real power had been wielded by the Shoguns, all of whom since 1603 were of the Tokugawa family. That the title of Shogun was more coveted than that of Emperor is understandable, when we recollect that since the ninth century there was never a time when the Emperor and the Court enjoyed real power. The monarchy persisted in one family because none of the ambitious leaders thought it worth while to usurp an office that held so little to tempt seekers after something more than an empty title.

With the coming of the foreigners and the realization that Japan could no longer shut herself off from the outside world, the position of the Shoguns became untenable. It was recognized that the situation demanded the restoration of the administrative authority of the Emperor and unification of the whole people in support of the throne. But the Tokugawas, when they gave up their peculiar position in the state, did so with the understanding that the Emperor should surround himself with advisers chosen from the clans, their own included. The Western clans, notably Choshu and Satsuma, were however not disposed to allow the survival of any shreds of the Tokugawa power, and accordingly civil war ensued ending in the complete triumph of the Choshu, Satsuma, Hizen and Tosa clans whose leaders now became not only the chief advisers of the Throne, but retained in their hands likewise the chief offices of authority and control of the nation's policies.

The country now entered upon a period of political reconstruction which ended in 1889 with the promulgation of the Constitution. With this period of reconstruction we need not detain ourselves. Suffice it to say that it was a time of confusion—not an altogether unnatural phenomenon when we

consider that these new institutions had to be developed out of a former feudalism that held tenaciously to its ancient rights in conflict with the new Imperial government. Out of the new state of things there arose a monarch basing his rights and privileges on theocratic principles, exercised by and with the advice of the Privy Council and Cabinet and the consent of the Imperial Diet, and in accordance with the terms of the Constitution.

Actually, a small group of the active Samurai of the Western clans, constituted themselves an oligarchy and in accordance with their own purposes and ideas exercised despotic power. The Emperor was in the hands of his Cabinet and they in turn were the instruments of the *extra-legal* body of men known as Genro, or Elder Statesmen. Occasionally the Genro themselves held office, but for the most part they exercised their sway from behind the doors of unofficialdom.

Japan received a Constitution, but it was a Constitution that was quite guiltless of any radical changes in the political system which it supplanted. A ruling caste had drawn it up and it was least of all to be expected that they would voluntarily deprive themselves of the advantages and privileges of rule and the sweets that go with the exercise of power, and particularly so when we consider the fact that the Japanese were a politically unripe people.

That, with such a Constitution, a struggle should be immediately inaugurated on the part of the people to obtain some amelioration in the application of the fixed principles of the Constitution, was of course inevitable. To set up the divine right dogma, to declare that the Constitution was merely a revision of "the ancient form of government," and finally to proclaim that the Constitution was established as a law which was to continue "to the remotest ages of time," was to deny all presumption of change in an effort to enforce obedience

to the provisions of the instrument. Against such a conception of Constitutional Government, public opinion, represented by a solidly organized union of politicians who had been the mainstay of the Opposition during the previous decade, made such a fight as was possible to it within the limited and narrow lines left open by the despotic forms of the law, and on several occasions, Cabinets were forced to resign by reason of the influence exercised by the challenge of the popular voice. But the hostility of the public did not go the length of demanding a change in the fundamental law that should accord them real representative Government, but was confined exclusively to attacks on clan government and the usurpation of power by the Genro.

To what extent any government, even an absolutist one like the Japanese, may persist in carrying out its policies, depends upon the force of public opinion. To continue long in a course in defiance of public sentiment is to court disaster. Where class government exists, as in Japan, it can only be overthrown by revolution. And it has this advantage over more popular forms of government that it has in its hands all the means—the public schools and the Press—for swaying public sentiment. When therefore, in spite of these advantages, the governing clique in Japan perceived that the struggles of the people to release themselves from the too severe restraints and bonds of the Constitution, were leading to popular unrest, they then began to make efforts to distract them and to turn their thoughts away from the domestic problems involved in a contest for popular rights, and to this end the nation was embarked upon the pathways of conquest and glory—beginning with the war with China in 1894.

It must always be remembered that during all this period there was no such thing as party government in Japan. The Government of oligarchs carried out its will, regardless of

the will of the majority in Opposition in the Diet. Whatever the changes might be in the complexion of the Diet after a general election, the Government went on its way undisturbed. It had within its control, under the Constitution, all the powers that were needed to keep the machinery of government running with or without the consent of the Diet. The power of appointment and dismissal of the Cabinet, by the 10th Article of the Constitution, was conferred upon the Emperor; the 55th Article made the Cabinet independent of the Diet; the 67th and 71st Articles reserved for the Government a sufficient control over finance. But, nevertheless, the Opposition, apparently so powerless, was able to paralyze the initiative of the Government in many directions. It produced a stagnation of political and economic development. Japan in 1894 was in a state of equilibrium that boded ill for the further development of the nation and indeed carried with it symptoms of a complete retardation of progress. It was a critical period for Japan. As an aspirant for full recognition of her claims to join the comity of nations, Japan's experiment along the lines of constitutional government was being keenly watched by the Powers, and if the much mooted question of treaty revision was to be decided in her favour, it depended in great part on the amount of enlightenment and justice displayed by the Government in its conduct of affairs both at home and abroad. And at just this critical juncture, we perceive the machinery of constitutional government in danger of a complete breakdown. The Government had made the attempt to control the elections, employing every device within their control—police power, repressive laws, bribery, intimidation and violence—and had failed. The Opposition had been returned with an increased majority. Repeated dissolutions of the Diet by Imperial rescript were found to serve no useful purpose, for after each new general election, the Opposition returned with new vigor

and with undiminished zeal for obstructive measures, to demonstrate that independent Cabinets could not run the Diet nor conduct the business of the Government in a satisfactory manner.

The war with China revived the militarism that had lain dormant since the close of the civil war between the Government and the Tokugawa Shogunate in the early 70's. All the strifes of party politics were immediately quenched, the Diet ceased its murmurs against the Cabinet and against clan government, and receded from its sternly restrictive attitude with reference to expenditures of the public funds. It voted supplies of men and money for the war equal to the demands of the most fiery chauvinists. For the first time since the opening of the Restoration epoch, the nation was solidly united in pursuit of a common aim. Enthusiasm for the war scarcely knew any bounds—the only fear was lest the Cabinet should call a halt before Peking was occupied by their victorious armies.

The issue of the war was a great disappointment to the Japanese people by reason of the fact that the dearest object of their hopes—possession of the Liaotung peninsula—the cession of which had already been wrung from the Chinese, was torn from their grasp by the intervention of Russia, France and Germany. Russia herself already had an eye on the same region and it was not part of her plan to permit an upstart nation like Japan to crowd her out from territory that should eventually provide her with ice-free ports on the Pacific ocean. But Russian action in this matter had the effect of still further whetting the militaristic ambitions of the Japanese, with the result that the next decade was devoted by the nation primarily to preparations for the conflict with Russia which was seen to be inevitable.

The oligarchy in control of the Government encouraged by the military and naval successes of the war now took steps to strengthen their hold on the reins of government by causing

new regulations to be adopted to the effect that only high officers in the active service of the Army and Navy could serve in the Cabinet in the respective Departments of War and the Navy. The effect of this provision was to make the military party in the state practically supreme, because it lay with them to decide upon the composition of each future Cabinet. For example, if a Minister President refused to support the policy of the military party, then no officers could be obtained to head the military departments, and no Cabinet could be formed, or if a Cabinet, once formed, were unwilling or unable to carry out its covenant with the Army and Navy, the Administration could be destroyed by simply ordering the resignation of the Ministers of those services. And this is the sort of government that holds sway in Japan to day, making that country a menace to the future peace of the world. In no other country in the world has there ever existed such a perfect system of control of the policies of a nation by a military caste.

With the adoption of this new measure, the oligarchy could well afford to make some concessions to the popular demand for the admission of party politicians to the Cabinet. Even if they went so far as to allow the formation of a party Cabinet, they had no fear of letting the direction of affairs slip from their hands. For, Satsuma and Choshu controlled the Army and Navy absolutely, and to this was now added the conduct of Colonial Administration which, like the two military branches of the service, was likewise made the subject of purely military direction.

Accordingly, as time went on, party politicians attained greater representation in future Cabinets, so that we find, as Home Minister in 1896, Itagaki who had stood outside the oligarchy, a voice crying in the wilderness, throughout his whole career, as foremost champion of the principle of representative government; and as Foreign Minister in 1897, Okuma

who had proven himself, in the course of a long career, a resourceful political leader, albeit a good deal of a demagogue; and finally the Okuma-Itagaki Ministry of 1898. To all outward appearance, it would seem from such participation in government by members of the Opposition as we have just indicated, that the party of progress and representative institutions had attained a substantial victory. In reality, however, no Cabinet has been free from the control of the Satsuma-Choshu oligarchy, exercising their power under sanction of the absolutist devices embodied in the Constitution and strengthened by the regulations for appointments to the War, Navy, and Colonial Departments already referred to, which date from the Chino-Japanese war. From this time forward, Yamagata as head of the military faction, greatly overshadowed in power and influence any other of the Japanese statesmen of his day, and by the same token, Ito, who had stood for the preponderance of the civil over the military influence, having reached the zenith of his career, now began to lose ground to Yamagata, the militarist, and in the end was completely driven from the field, checkmated at every turn by his opponent's superior strategy. It was as if a Von Moltke had driven a Bismarck from office and retained the reins in his own hands. Ito's last attempt to stem the rising tide of militarism was made in 1900 when he organized the new and powerful Seiyukai party with a platform that embraced many liberal ideas such as the promotion of education, encouragement of agriculture, manufactures and commerce, extension of local autonomy, and reform in the administrative departments. But the program likewise embraced several reactionary features such as his support of the Imperial prerogative, and adhesion to a narrow construction of the Constitution. Herein was Ito's great failure as a statesman. Had he been able wholly to free himself from his former associations and to advocate constitutional progress, he

might have succeeded in destroying the power of all the oligarchs, whether military or otherwise, by the gradual adoption of responsible government. But Ito missed his chance. His Ministry, conducted under the aegis of the Seiyukai party, lasted a year. With its fall in 1901, Ito's career as a parliamentarian came to an end. Like Frankenstein he had created a monster for himself when, in 1894, to distract the attention of the nation from the problems of political progress, he brought on the war with China. That monster was militarism, and by militarism was Ito destroyed.

As we have before intimated, Japan, having once been launched upon her career of imperialism by the war with China, set about immediately to prepare to round out her course by removing Russia from her path of progress in the Far East. Russia's aggressions on China, her disregard of the principles of the Open Door and equal opportunity, and her ill-concealed invasions of China's sovereign rights and territorial integrity, made Japan's task the easier of fulfillment, for Russia had lost thereby the friendly support and sympathy of such powerful world factors as Great Britain and the United States. Japan, on the other hand, was clever enough to gain what Russia had lost, by representing herself as the champion of those very principles which Russia, with incomprehensible foolhardiness, had so flagrantly flaunted. The two Powers apparently were completely "taken in," for they gave their ungrudging moral, economic and financial support to Japan throughout the war without realizing that they were lending their aid to a nation of chauvinists whose national policy was to be the expansion of the Empire to include Korea, Manchuria, Mongolia and all Siberia, East of Lake Baikal. Had these Powers known that the idea of such an empire had been for generations one of the fundamentals in the higher education of Japan's ruling class, it is doubtful if they would have lent themselves to a political

course that would endanger the peace of the Far East and ultimately of the entire world for generations to come.

That the defeat of Russia by Japan in 1904-1905 was one of the underlying causes of the recent world war, if not the proximate cause of it, will, we believe, be the impartial verdict of history. For, Russia thrown back in her efforts for expansion in Asia, immediately adopted in her foreign policy the principle of a Pan-Slavic expansion in Europe. And if she could not have Port Arthur and Dalny, then she must have Constantinople and possibly Salonika.

With the close of the Russian war, Japan turned her attention to consolidating her position upon the continent of Asia. Her repeated guarantees of the independence of Korea, devised for the purpose of securing the safety of that state until Japan was ready to carry out her design of absorption, were now treated as obsolete, and in 1905 as has been described in a previous chapter, Japan prepared to carry out her intentions with regard to Korea by taking over control of Korea's Foreign Affairs and the appointment of a Resident-General in Seoul. Interference by Great Britain was out of the question in view of the latter's recognition of Japan's paramount interests in Korea in the Treaty of 1905. The United States likewise signified her acquiescence by the withdrawal of her diplomatic representative at Seoul.

Having taken the first steps towards the complete absorption of Korea (afterwards consummated in 1910), Japan now turned her attention to China. By the year 1906, she had firmly established herself in Korea, had compelled China to recognize the transfer of Russia's concessions in the Liaotung peninsula, had secured from China new railway and commercial concessions in Manchuria, and was dominating the trade and industry of Manchuria to the exclusion of her rivals, albeit in violation of the principles of the Open Door and

equal opportunity for which she showed as little respect as for her repeated assurances with regard to China's territorial integrity. Between the years 1907 and 1910 Japan's relations with Russia were modified to Japan's advantage in the manner already related. And in 1915, in the midst of the world war, Japan set out to complete the task of accomplishing the subjugation of China and its conversion into a second Korea. And accordingly, the Japanese Government inaugurated their program by making encroachments not only in Manchuria and Mongolia but in the 'Middle Kingdom' itself. A Japanese garrison and wireless station at Hankow, the great industrial centre of inner China is a fact that significantly indicates the new Chino-Japanese relations. For the rest, the author has gone into the subject quite fully in *The Problem of Japan* and in the previous chapters of the present work.

There now remain for us to consider what conclusions are to be drawn from the changed and still changing relations between Britain and Japan. In this connection it is significant to note the changes that have taken place in the respective treaties of 1902, 1905 and 1911.

In the first treaty, it was provided that Britain should come to the assistance of Japan in case of an attack in which a third power should join as an aggressor. In the second treaty assistance was made conditional upon an attack by a *single* power. In the first treaty the scope of Britain's engagement was limited to "maintaining the independence and territorial integrity of the Empire of China and the Empire of Korea." In the second treaty, its scope was widened to include "the consolidation and maintenance of the general peace in the regions of Eastern Asia and India," and further by granting Japan a free hand in Korea.

In the third treaty (1911), firstly, a modification was made with respect to the Korean clauses, their omission being justi-

fied by Japan's annexation of Korea; in the next place, England having ceased to fear an attack on India from the side of Russia, by reason of her *entente* with the latter country, no mention was made of India; and finally, the treaty was further emasculated by providing that England need not come to Japan's assistance in case of attack by a Power with whom she had concluded a Treaty of General Arbitration. This was inserted in view of the impending Treaty of General Arbitration between Britain and the United States.

Thus we see how greatly modified the relations of Britain and Japan were at the time of the conclusion of the last treaty.

To understand the change, it has to be remembered that the two important factors in British Foreign policy since the accession of William II to the German Imperial throne were the attitude of Germany and the attitude of Russia. Originally, and down to the close of the Russo-Japanese war, British politics were influenced more by fear of Russia than by fear of Germany. Russian expansion in the direction of Asia Minor, the Persian Gulf and India were during this period the *bête noir* of British diplomacy. But the *rapprochement* with Russia that soon followed upon the close of the Russo-Japanese war brought about a complete change of front. The British fleet was withdrawn from Pacific waters and centred in the North sea. The Japanese alliance, once so eagerly sought by Britain as a check upon Russia in the Far East, was no longer a *sine qua non* of her national policy. Britain's relations with India, always the key to her attitude in Eastern politics, were now threatened from a new direction. German expansion towards the East, as witnessed by the growing relations of cordiality between Germany and the *Sublime Porte*, and her construction of the Bagdad Railway, opened up entirely new causes for alarm in England, and it was, from henceforth, Germany that had to be watched and feared.

The situation at the present moment can, likewise, be resolved in the light of the foregoing facts. So far as Britain is concerned, and her situation in India, both of her former enemies, Germany and Russia, whose expansion had been a menace to her position in Asia, are now "out of it," so to speak, and she has now only Japan to deal with, a nation whose expansion in Asia has not yet reached the danger point for England. But with Japan no further alliance is at all thinkable, for the reason that she is no longer needed to check an expanding Russia, but must herself be checked before she in her turn becomes a menace to British interests in Asia.

In the foregoing brief sketch of the Japanese national policies, from the beginning of the Restoration period down to the present time, we have attempted to indicate the underlying causes for Japan's isolated position in the world politics of to-day. By tradition, by the form of her political institutions, and by the character of the political education of her statesmen the Japanese have been trained to become a nation of militarists. Japan, alone of the nations of the world, is devoted to the cult of militarism, and it remains yet to be seen whether or not the national arrogance bred of that cult has blinded her to the lessons of the recent war which teach that there is no room in the modern world for a nation that cherishes the militaristic spirit.

CHAPTER TEN.

The Forces of Reaction and of Progress.

No fact arising out of the conflict of ideas that has arisen at the Peace Conference can be said to stand out with greater prominence than this one, namely, that the supreme and crowning work of the Conference must be so to lay the foundations of the future peace of the world as will guarantee the abolition of the institution of war. Whatever differences of opinion have existed among the delegates, and those differences have been wide and deep, there has at least been complete unanimity upon this point, that with the return of the members of the Conference to their homes, after the conclusion of their deliberations, they must be able to take with them for presentation to the peoples whom they severally represent, an agreed plan which will satisfactorily embody some practical method for ending war for all time. And it is pretty fairly recognized by now that failure to carry out this one great essential of the Conference is very likely to result in popular demonstrations throughout the world to be followed by revolutions that will completely upset the old order and substitute in its place a new one that will probably rest almost exclusively upon a labour party or proletariat governing basis. In the ensuing chaos, governments will suffer such shocks as will render certain a series of national bankruptcies without a parallel in the history of the world.

Realizing the overwhelming importance of the task that

confronts them, leading statesmen are devoting the best energies of themselves and their environment to secure what to them seems a safe solution.

It is profoundly unfortunate, however, that the ideas as to the methods by which this future state of security is to be attained, should show such widely divergent and contrary tendencies.

On the one hand, we perceive a school of realists who sit with the map of Europe spread out before them and at their elbows the technical expert, the mathematician and the statistician. This group of future world-makers are striving to build up a new era out of the same elements as contributed to bring about the cataclysm of 1914. From their calculations one supreme element is forever lacking—the element of goodwill towards mankind and particularly towards such large and important constituent parts of the world as the Russian and the German peoples. These men live in the past. They refuse to believe in any possible regeneration of the human spirit. They will not believe that the bitterest opponent of militarism and imperialism throughout the whole world today is the nation that has suffered most from war and conscription, whose history has been one long agony of preparedness for and apprehension of war, and whose soil has for centuries been drenched with the blood of her own sons forced to fight or go under in the struggle for independent existence. The foundation of the new German free state does not impress such men because they refuse to see below the surface and to study the true psychological tendencies of the Teutonic race.

They fear the Teutons and they fear the Russians. The mere possibility that in a no distant future the German Michel may get to harmonize with the Russian moujik fills them with horror, and although there would seem to be nothing unnatural in the fact that two great neighboring peoples should try

to understand each other and work together for mutual benefit, your chauvinist can see in the fact, only harm for the rest of the world and he is accordingly bending all his energies to establish some artificial barriers that shall separate the two nations. Hence the map, and the technical experts, the mathematician and the statistician who sit, day and night, poring over their secret devices for creating in middle Europe a block of states with the object of completely shutting Germany off from any immediate connection with Russia. That is the reason for the tremendous agitation that exists in certain circles over Polish boundaries, and all the other questions of national boundary involving the Czechs, the Slavs, the Rumanians and the Hungarians.

The tendency of the activities of these realist chauvinists is, accordingly, to encourage and support all separatist movements and to discourage and oppose movements that may bring the nations of Central and Eastern Europe into closer relations based on mutual understanding and good-will. Hence, the French support of the centrifugal tendencies that for a time threatened the unity of the German Federated Free State. And for the same reasons, French support of a League of Nations meant, not support of a real League of Nations, of the weak and small, as well as of the great and powerful, but of an *alliance* of Nations organized primarily for two objects—(1) To protect the members of the alliance in the enjoyment of the spoils of war and (2) To prevent collisions between states standing outside the alliance, or an attack by the one group of states upon the other.

It is due to the same influences that we have our first draft of a League of Nations that gives (1) predominance to the great military powers and foreshadows inequality not merely for the enemy states but for the smaller Allies and neutrals (2) that makes such a league a buttress of the *status quo ante*

bellum so far as the small nations are concerned (3) that fails to define the rights of the small nations, or to provide the machinery by which the principles are to be applied (4) that employs the old doctrines of territorial integrity to perpetuate any abuses or tyranny which may exist within the territories of members of the alliance, who thus propose to constitute themselves as champions of freedom—for others. (5) that would apply the principles of the League to Germany, Russia, Turkey and Austria, but not to themselves (6) that makes no provision for popular representation (7) that excludes Germany and Russia from participation in the formation of the League, and, if afterwards admitted, deprives them of equal rights with such nations as Italy and Japan (8) that permits the Executive Council of the League to impose its will upon nations outside the League (9) that gives the five war Allies a perpetual majority in the Executive Council of the League, and this Council to perform every real determinant act under the constitution of the League, and to possess even the right to inquire into non-justiciable disputes (10) that confines the application of the mandatory principle to the conquered dependencies of Germany and Turkey, although if it is good for these, it must be equally good for the Belgian Congo, the French, Portuguese, Italian, British and American protectorates (11) that fails to apply to all the countries subject to mandatory treatment, the principle of the Open Door (12) that provides freedom of transit and equitable (*not equal*) treatment for the commerce of all States, members of the League.

Such are some of the proposals that are championed by those reactionary influences that accept a League of Nations only in so far as it may be made the creature of designs for their own aggrandizement. And it is against such influences that all the really progressive and humanitarian forces throughout the world must solidly unite.

And accordingly we see, on the other hand, a school of statesmen, intellectuals and leaders of the popular movements of the day, standing together under the leadership of President Wilson to convert into practical terms the ideals and principles that have been pronounced for the upbuilding of a new age. And in spite of the clogs on the wheels of progress placed there by the reactionary forces to which reference has been made, it is believed, without giving way to too great an optimism, that some substantial advance is being made, day by day, towards the consummation of the plans involved in the wider outlook whose foundations are laid first of all on the basic rock of good-will and amity towards all mankind. There have been signs that some of those nations who in the past have been noted for their pursuit of the opportune gains of the moment are coming to realize that the human family of nations are in their relations to one another like the various *membra* of the human body, and that a shock to one of its members is felt throughout all the other organs, that the sickness or disease of one organ affects other organs, deprives the whole body of elasticity and strength, cripples initiative, slows up the functions and contributes generally to a condition of unhealth, weakness and decay. They perceive that it is just as necessary to the restoration of sound national life everywhere that Germany be well and prosperous and Russia likewise, as that they themselves, victors in a world struggle, should possess health and strength.

With a return of this saner view of international obligations must likewise come saner and more enlightened views as to the treatment to be accorded former enemies. And in this connection one of the signs of the times is the proposition that some international control be exercised over the publication of information in the public press, the suppression so far as is possible of the dissemination of false news, and particularly

of news of a tendencious character which in reality is the occasion of more evil even than the pure inventions of malicious and unscrupulous news-vendors. To this end the writer believes that the right to establish international news service bureaus, serving purely national ends like Reuter, or Havas, or Wolff, should in some manner be placed under control. If all international agencies could be fused or gathered into one large "holding company" upon whose directorate every important nation in the world might receive representation, a great step will have been taken to avoid future rivalries and misunderstandings, as well as to assure the world against the resumption of campaigns of hatred and malice which in the past have been so rife a source of international estrangement.

The most important and far-reaching results of the war are, in the writer's opinion, the changed position of affairs in Germany and Russia, and their certain adoption of some form of democratic and representative government. What the future relations of these two great nations to each other is to be, is a matter of the very first importance to the rest of the world. The very fact that certain influences are frantically busy about creating or proposing to create artificial barriers between the two countries, shows conclusively that it is recognized how quickly these two countries, if left to their own free and private inclinations, will succeed in establishing friendly and mutually helpful relations. The German has always played a great role in Russia in the past, and he is destined to play an even greater role in the future. The Russian nature is not vindictive. He does not regard the German with aversion, nor does he attribute to him any more than his just share of responsibility for the outbreak of the Great War and of his own calamities arising therefrom. And the average German, on the other hand, has always been more or less well disposed towards his Eastern neighbor, at least in matters of trade and

leaving out of consideration the constant war bogey from the Russian side that used to disturb his spirit. Accordingly, we have in these mutual feelings of good-will, which have been strengthened rather than weakened by the outcome of the war, a solid basis for *rapprochement* between the two peoples. On every other side but the Russian, the Germans are hemmed in by peoples who refuse to lay aside their ill-will, and will for a long time to come manifest some form of hatred or opposition to the *Boche*. But those populous and mighty Germanic tribes are as little likely to be hemmed in and confined within artificial barriers as is the Mississippi or the Amazon to be controlled or dammed behind any artificial bulwarks. Indirectly, therefore, the more Germany's former enemies pursue a policy of hemming the German stream in one direction, the more it will overspread the country in some other direction. The same thing is true of the Allies' proposal to deprive Germany of her colonies. This piece of folly, if carried out, will in course of time surely revenge itself upon those who committed it and in a manner to which no possible exception can be taken. For, the Germans being refused an outlet for their energies in the distant colonies, will gradually overspread Holland, Switzerland, Poland and other surrounding countries and quietly absorb them. These countries must in time become German unless the Allies see their mistake in time and not only remove all restrictions on the free movement of Germans to other parts of the world and all obstacles in the way of colonization and settlement in German-owned Colonial possessions, but also provide for absolute equal opportunity, the Open Door and the leveling of all economic barriers wherever in the world those advantages are accorded to the most favoured nation.

Do the British, for example, believe that by causing the Germans to be driven out of China they are permanently

serving their own best interests? The British have all along protested that their attitude of opposition to the German was not in the least influenced by trade-envy or jealousy, or by fear of the German's superior efficiency in securing and retaining world trade and world markets. If this reflects the true state of the British mind, then why are such strenuous and continued efforts made long after hostilities have ceased, to place the German in a position of economic and industrial dependence?

The Englishman like every one else will be judged in the final analysis, not by his words but by his actions. When the Allied contingents entered Pekin to relieve the legations in the Boxer Rebellion, the French, Russians, and Japanese deliberately voted to permit their soldiers to loot. The British and Americans gave their voice against looting, but the English although giving their voice for no looting, added they should continue to "place in safe-keeping all valuable things" found in the district given them to police. This, of course, gave them practically the right to loot, although whatever was brought in had to be placed in one spot, where an auction was afterwards held, and the amount of the proceeds divided *pro rata* to the officers and men in accordance with an officially prescribed method. On the record, therefore, the British stood for no looting, and in practise looted to the same extent as their French, Russian and Japanese colleagues.

The writer trusts that he will not be accused of any anti-British feeling if he uses the foregoing incident as an illustration of his meaning in suggesting that the British must expect to be judged by their acts and not by their words. And in this connection the writer takes the same position as the writer of an article in a recent monthly bulletin, published by America's greatest financial institution, the National City Bank of New-York in which it is clearly pointed out that certain countries are on the point of over-doing their efforts to crowd Germany

from the world's markets and that such an over-reaching attitude may create anew a public opinion that envy and jealousy of German success in capturing so large a part of the world's markets was a prominent factor in creating a situation leading to war in 1914.

And now again, when steps have been taken, chiefly at British instigation to drive German merchants and traders from China, at the very moment when peace is a virtual reality and German industry and commerce lies prostrated, there is called to mind what a prominent British author wrote in 1907 on a visit to Hong Kong.

British trade is slipping away, drifting into the hands of the enterprising Americans, the industrious Germans, the indefatigable Japanese, and the unsleeping Chinese. The representatives of these nations work while Englishmen abroad play. The home-keeping public cannot conceive of the proportion of the working year that, in the Orient, is devoted to holiday. In England, by the strenuous effort of Sir John Lubbock, we have secured six bank holidays in twelve months. In the Far East those six are prolonged to nine days, and, in addition, business is suspended during the Spring Race Meeting and during the Autumn Race Meeting, during Chinese New Year, during the cricket week, and upon certain other occasions of festivity, until the six days of legal cessation from work become twenty days. Every evening, at five o'clock, the great bar of the Hong Kong Club is lined with the British who have finished their day's work. In the street the offices of the British firms are dark and silent, but from the windows of the German merchants broad streams of electric light signal the nation's industry until after midnight. On Sundays the British, to a man, are engaged in launch parties and on bathing excursions, at golf and at play. The Germans devote at least a portion of the day to work. The world rolls on without heed to holidays, and our commerce suffers while our agents play.—Douglas Story in *To-morrow in the Far East*.

The author has written the foregoing at the risk of being charged with inconsistency in the advancement of the proposition of a future unity of action between Britain, Germany, and America on the one hand, and this new demonstration of British hostility to German interests on the other. But the inconsistency, if it exists, is of a temporary character. Steps which Britain is taking now, before the definite closing of a peace, she will be ready and willing to repudiate six months from now when peace is once more attained and Germany is once again restored to the family of the nations on a peace footing, and in the full vigor and strength of her newly conquered position as a democracy made up for the most part of industrious workers to whom the world owes a living and a place in the sun. With such a new Germany, Britain will be quite ready to close the new understanding, whereby she will likewise hope to exert some influence upon her future relations with Russia, as well. For, it is going to be recognized that only by cooperation with Germany can Russia really be made accessible to Western influence. The world is big enough for everybody. China and Russia between them possess vast unexplored resources. No one nation has either the right or the power to exploit them all. The one policy that can unite and satisfy them all in this connection, is the policy of the Open Door and equal opportunity. As regards Russia, Germany is her immediate neighbor. Her lines of railway connect with the Russian lines, her traders and merchants are daily passing to and fro across the Russian frontier, a community of interests in many of the problems that are involved in the questions of access to markets, exchanges of raw materials and manufactured goods, development of the border provinces, tariffs and customs—all these facts are certain to promote a feeling of reciprocity between the two countries, and any attempt to erect artificial barriers to arrest

the action of such great natural processes will be overthrown as easily as a Japanese screen.

The bearing that these matters have upon the question of the isolation of Japan does not require to be reiterated here. Suffice it so say that the vital interests of America and Britain make it absolutely essential not only to restore conditions of health and order in Germany and Russia, but to secure these states as their friends and allies in pursuit of their common aims and ideals—to make the world secure from future warfare and to make the length of their arm reach from San Francisco to Cologne, and from Cologne to Vladivostock.

CHAPTER ELEVEN.

Japan and the Exclusion Acts.

In the Japanese House of Peers, Count Okuma said on the 18th of February:—"For consummating the League of Nations, nothing is more important than the removal of racial discrimination: but that some people are insufficiently advanced in civilization may be seen from the necessity of actually existing extra-territoriality. Japan, however, is now among the Five Great Powers, and is fully entitled to demand equality in every respect, including the removal of racial discrimination. Much will depend on Japan's delegates in Paris giving practical efficiency to this most important problem, not only for Japan, but for the practicability of the League."

The reference to "extra-territoriality" in the foregoing speech of the former Japanese Premier and present Genro statesman, directs attention, of course, to the laws against Japanese immigrants, and the description of Australians, Canadians and Californians as "insufficiently advanced in civilization" is a hit at their uncompromising attitude towards Japanese immigration in the face of Japan's position in the front rank of the civilized nations and of the leading great Powers of the world.

Moreover, we perceive in the raising of this question at the Peace Conference, with the implied threat on Count Okuma's part to wreck the project of the League of Nations unless the Japanese "colour bar" is removed by the United States and the British Dominions, a confirmation of the author's prognosis

of this situation in *The Problem of Japan*. There, it was predicted that Japan, relying upon her unquestionable right, in principle, to insist on her moral and legal claim (her legal claim rests upon existing treaties) to have the British Dominions and the United States thrown open to Japanese immigration, would raise the "colour bar," question at the Peace Conference for the purpose of influencing Great Britain and the United States to consent to certain other proposals involving Japan's paramount position in the Far East, and which to her practical soul are of far greater importance than the establishment of her right to send her emigrants to Australia, New Zealand, British Columbia, and to California, where they are not wanted.

In principle, of course, right and justice are entirely on the Japanese side. Japan is not an African "nigger state", nor an Asiatic archipelago peopled by inferior Malay tribes, but a nation on the highest plane of modern civilization, that has fought three great foreign wars and emerged from them with new might and glory, in which she broke forever the tradition that the white peoples are superior to the Asiatic. She possesses a mighty army, now two million strong, and she can build superdreadnoughts like the Fuse, Ise and Hiuga. In the realms of commerce, still living Japanese have seen their country's export trade grow from zero to nearly one billion dollars (£ 200,000,000) per year. As the conqueror over China in the war of 1894-1895 and as leader of the allied contingents sent to relieve the besieged legations in Peking during the Boxer Rebellion, Japan not only attained to a position of supremacy over the Yellow Race but her position of supremacy was recognized by Europe and America; and by her defeat of Russia in 1904-1905, she leaped at a bound to a position of pre-eminence in Far Eastern affairs which was still further consolidated by Great Britain's action in accepting her as an

ally for offensive and defensive purposes in the treaties of 1902, 1905 and 1911.

For Great Britain, therefore, the Japanese Immigration Question is a particularly acute one, for she cannot consistently refuse to concede to Japanese nationals, rights equal to those of the most favoured nation, when at the same time these very Japanese are the formally accepted and recognized brothers-in-arms of the British nation and considered good enough, as such, to fight for, to defend, and if necessary die for British interests in Asia.

With the principles of right and justice entirely on her side, Japan may now urge the settlement of this question upon both Britain and America, and refuse to take part in a League of Nations unless all disabilities under which Japanese immigration to these countries now stands, are entirely abolished. And the seriousness of the situation lies not alone in Japanese refusal to join a league of nations—and that by itself is serious enough—but in the fact that the example of Japanese non-participation would be likely to be followed by some other great nations, and the world might see itself confronted with the spectacle of two great and formidable combinations of states facing each other—not as leagues of nations to keep the peace, but as real alliances, offensive and defensive, threatening the future peace of the world before the ink is dry on the papers that conclude the Peace after the Great War.

Accordingly, there is no problem before the Peace Delegates in Paris that presents more acute difficulties than this one. For, the representatives of Great Britain and the United States are faced with this situation. If they concede Japan's righteous claims for the abolition of racial discrimination towards her nationals and the repeal of all exclusion acts or restrictive laws imposing unequal treatment on Japanese as compared with other more favoured nations, then they will be confronted

with the unalterable opposition of a section of their own people which may lead to serious internal discord. Australia, for example, will not even have her Asiatic neighbor in New Guinea. A White Australia is a *sine qua non* for Australian statesmen at the Peace Conference, impelled thereto by the demands of the Labour party in the island continent. Their mandate is an arbitrary one, and Australia's withdrawal from the British Empire is foreshadowed in case of any British yielding. It is a case where great compromisers like Lloyd George and President Wilson are powerless, because racial prejudice rejects every argument of reason.

The problem is equally acute in British Columbia where matters reached such a pass during the immigration period a few years ago, that mob violence broke out in Vancouver and went on all night, with Japanese officials in the thick of the fray. Fifty-six Asiatic shops, hotels, cook-shops, and offices were utterly wrecked in one orgy.

In California we see a similar state of affairs. To win her over to a more rational view-point, the Washington government has tried diplomacy, coaxing, threats and rational argument but all to no purpose against the deep-seated racial repugnance that exists there. For, California maintains that the question is purely a Pacific Coast problem, and insists on her right to pass all the anti-Japanese laws she deems necessary in spite of the Federal Government's attitude of protest against such a course, so inimical to national interests, and threatens even to secede from the Union rather than submit to the Federal view. The matter was temporarily arranged in 1907 by the Root-Takahira agreement, under which Japan agreed voluntarily to restrict her own emigration and to refuse passports to her Japanese labourers seeking admission to the United States. The dilemma in which the United States is placed by the reopening of the question now threatens to be fraught with

serious consequences in more than one direction. To meet the question in an indirect way, the Congress of the United States is proposing to enact a law which shall exclude *all* aliens, at least for a term of years. By the enactment of such a law the United States hopes, temporarily at all events, to side-step the question of discriminatory treatment of one class of foreigners—the Japanese—and thus avoid an open rupture with Japan which would be sure to follow in case of refusal, and internal troubles which would be equally sure to follow in case of assent. Such an immigration policy on the part of the United States will, however, be followed by very serious consequences to economic development, and will handicap trade and industry, as well as a well-ordered social life, if persisted in for any long period of years. The future rapid growth and development of industry and commerce in the United States would be able, almost immediately, to absorb to great advantage a large European immigration. But when to the fact of stopping immigration entirely, we add the further fact that there are, according to reliable estimates, 1,500,000 to 2,000,000 foreigners, mostly labourers, now in the United States who have been patiently waiting for the coming of peace in order to return to their native lands, we may get some idea of how greatly America will come to suffer for lack of "hands" in the event that the present policy of exclusion is found to be susceptible of no amelioration.

But the question is, after all, whether such half-measures as these can permanently solve the problem of Japanese exclusion, or whether it will not be found better in the general interest, to come to conclusions on the subject. Great Britain is faced with the identical question and certainly the British Colonies, particularly Canada and Australia, so decidedly in need of all the new colonists they can get—provided they are of European stock—will be unable to follow America's example and solve

the question of Japanese exclusion by passing a general exclusion act.

Assuming, therefore, that the two great English-speaking nations will find it impossible, for the reasons stated, to make satisfactory concessions to Japan with respect to the immigration question, the one other peaceable alternative will be to consent to Japan's very radical demands with respect to Asia. But it is inconceivable that Great Britain and the United States will consent to the exercise by Japan of her extreme claims with respect to the Far East and more particularly, with respect to China, and accordingly the only other honest alternative must necessarily be war. And if war comes we have already seen in the previous pages of this book the position of isolation in which Japan will find herself if she holds fast to her present policies and doctrines with respect to her claims of paramountcy in the Far East.

Moreover, there is a possibility that the Chinese question may be settled in the manner suggested by a great Japanese statesman who said that the Chinese question would never be settled right until China has succeeded in arousing her national spirit and her national defences to the point where she herself can successfully resist and overcome the aggression of the foreigner.

FINIS.

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Renewals and recharges may be made 4 days prior to due date

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
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